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Collective Action Clauses & Corporate Bond 
Spreads: Evidence from Chile 
Carlos Berdejó * 
Abstract: The use of collective action clauses (CACs) in public bonds has 
received significant attention in academic and policy circles in recent years. 
While the existing literature suggests that market participants in sovereign and 
corporate bond markets often opt to include CACs when allowed under the 
applicable governing law, whether CACs create or destroy economic value is an 
open question. Notably, the studies examining the value of CACs have largely 
focused on sovereign bonds, devoting minor attention to public corporate debt, a 
gap in the literature which this Article addresses. 
This Article assesses the value of CACs by exploiting a recent reform in the legal 
regime governing CACs in Chile, wherein previously banned CACs are now 
allowed in public corporate debt. Interest rate spreads for bonds issued with a 
CAC after the reform are on average 20% lower than those of bonds that do not 
include such clauses. The average effect, 28.5 basis points, translates to annual 
savings of over U.S. $415,000, which add up to approximately U.S. $6.0 million 
during the course of the life of the average bond. This finding is robust to 
controlling for various issuer characteristics and is replicated in specifications 
that include issuer fixed effects, confirming that these results are not driven by 
unobservable issuer characteristics. The analyses also suggest that including a 
CAC can potentially benefit all issuers regardless of their creditworthiness, a 
result contrary to earlier studies in this area. 
These findings provide a positive assessment of the recent legal reforms in Chile 
and, most importantly, strengthen the case for repealing the longstanding 
prohibition on CACs in public corporate debt issued under U.S. law. The 
experience in Chile suggests that repealing this ban on CACs would result in 
lower interest rates, substantially reducing the cost of capital for U.S. 
corporations, the vast majority of which primarily rely on the bond markets to 
conduct their financing activities. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION  
The use of collective action clauses (CACs) in public bonds has 
received considerable attention in academic, practitioner and policy circles 
in recent years.1 In Europe, the Greek debt crisis highlighted the important 
role that CACs can play in the restructuring of sovereign debt.2 A series of 
similar crises in the sovereign debt markets during the mid and late 1990’s 
spurred the adoption of CACs in sovereign debt governed by New York 
law.3 These experiences in the sovereign debt markets also left their mark in 
the corporate bond markets. Countries that previously banned the use of 
CACs in corporate debt, such as Chile and Germany, have recently enacted 
reforms to allow the inclusion of these clauses, moves that have been 
welcomed by market participants.4 In the United States, one of the few 
 
 1  See, e.g., Marc M. Rossell, Can Collective Action Clauses Migrate to the Latam Corporate Bond 
Market?, 18 LATIN AM. L. & BUS. R., no. 12, Dec. 2010, at 1; W. Mark C. Weidermaier & Mitu Gulati, 
A People’s History of Collective Action Clauses, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 51, 52–55 (2013); Elaine Moore, 
IMF Recommends Overhaul of Sovereign Bonds, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2014, 3:23 PM), 
http://on.ft.com/1sZIpcI. 
 2  See Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch and Mitu Gulati, The Greek Debt Restructuring: An 
Autopsy (Peterson Inst. For Int’l Econ. Working Paper No. 13-8, 2013), 
http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp13-8.pdf. 
 3  See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 4  See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text (discussing the German reform) and notes 80–83 
and accompanying text (discussing the Chilean reform). 
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countries that still ban the use of CACs in corporate debt, the prohibition of 
CACs has long been the subject of continuous scrutiny.5 
A CAC allows a qualifying majority of bondholders to approve 
changes to the original core terms of an outstanding bond issue (such as the 
interest rate, maturity and principal amount) in a manner that binds all 
bondholders.6 One of the economic rationales for including such a provision 
is to facilitate renegotiations between the issuer and bondholders in the 
event that the issuer later needs to restructure its debt in order to manage 
financial distress. 7 In such an event, individual creditors may find it in their 
own interest not to participate in a proposed restructuring, while hoping that 
a sufficient number of their fellow creditors will do so, thus ensuring that 
the issuer survives and allowing the holdout creditor to receive payment of 
her claim in full.8 The problem, of course, is that if enough creditors follow 
such a strategy, the proposed workout will fail. 9 By making a workout 
proposal approved by a qualified majority of bondholders binding on 
dissenting bondholders, CACs serve as an ex-ante contractual solution to 
this holdout problem.10  
While the existing evidence suggests that market participants in both 
sovereign and corporate bond markets often opt to include CACs when 
allowed to do so, the question of whether such provisions create or destroy 
economic value is still an open one.11 Existing research examining this 
question has been inconclusive: while some studies have found that the 
inclusion of CACs is associated with lower interest rates, other studies have 
found no such relationship or have found such relationship to exist only for 
a subset of issuers. Moreover, the vast majority of these studies suffer a key 
methodological flaw—they do not review the underlying contractual 
documents to determine the presence of a CAC, relying instead on the 
governing law of the instrument as a proxy.12 In addition, these studies have 
largely focused on sovereign debt, devoting little to no attention to 
corporate bonds.13  
This Article provides an empirical assessment of the value of CACs by 
examining the recent experience in the Chilean corporate bond market.14 
Chile previously had a legal regime similar to that which currently exists in 
the United States, wherein CACs were effectively banned in most corporate 
 
 5  See infra notes 41–48 and accompanying text. 
 6  See infra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 7  See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 8  See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 9  See infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 10  See infra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 11  See infra Part II.B. 
 12  See infra notes 59–67 and accompanying text. 
 13  See infra notes 68–71 and accompanying text. 
 14  See infra Part III.A. 
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bond issues.15 In 2007, Chilean law was reformed to enable contracting 
parties to include CACs in bond indentures and to select the qualifying 
majority that may authorize changes to the core terms, provided that such 
majority is greater than 75% of the aggregate principal amount of the bonds 
outstanding.16 These reforms to Chile’s legal regime governing CACs 
present a unique opportunity to assess the economic value of CACs in the 
context of corporate debt.  
To conduct my analyses, I constructed a hand-collected dataset of 195 
Chilean corporate bonds issued between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 
2013.17 For each issue I reviewed the prospectus and corresponding 
indenture to gather information about the issuer, the offering, and the 
contractual terms governing the bonds and further complemented this data 
with financial information filed by issuers with Chilean regulatory bodies. 
Overall, the results indicate that the Chilean legal reform has yielded 
measurable economic benefits. Bonds issued with a CAC after the reform 
have spreads that are, on average, 20% lower than those bond issues that do 
not include such clauses.18 The average effect, 28.5 basis points, translates 
to annual interest savings of over U.S. $415,000 for the average bond 
offering (approximately U.S. $145 million in aggregate principal amount) 
which, over the course of fourteen years (the average maturity in the 
sample), add up to approximately U.S. $6.0 million. This main result is 
robust to including controls for an issuer’s size, credit rating, capital 
structure, as well as the bond issue’s offering size, year, and maturity.19 
Specifications that include issuer fixed effects confirm that these results are 
not driven by unobservable variables.20 In addition, the analyses suggest 
that adopting a CAC can potentially benefit all issuers regardless of their 
credit rating, a result contrary to earlier studies in this area.21 
The existence of a negative correlation between the inclusion of a 
CAC and the interest rate of the corresponding bond indicates that issuers 
and investors are adopting these clauses in transactions where their 
inclusion results in optimal, more efficient arrangements that create 
economic value. Such a finding informs a number of ongoing debates 
surrounding the use of CACs. First, it provides a positive assessment of the 
recent legal reforms in Chile and Germany, which repealed statutory 
prohibitions on the use of CACs in corporate debt. More generally, the 
 
 15  See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 16  See infra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 17  For a description of the dataset see infra Part III.B. 
 18  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 19  See infra Part IV.A.1. In addition, the restrictive financial covenants contained in the indentures 
governing bonds that contain CACs and those that do not contain CACs are strikingly similar. See infra 
Part IV.A.3.  
 20  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 21  See infra Part IV.B. 
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results suggest that corporate issuers and investors should strongly consider 
including CACs in the instruments governing their bonds when allowed to 
do so by applicable law and providing additional support for the inclusion 
of CACs in sovereign debt, an issue that has recently received much 
attention.22  
From a policy perspective, the experience in Chile strengthens the case 
for repealing the longstanding ban on CACs in public corporate debt issued 
under U.S. law.23 The critical role played by the bond market for corporate 
U.S. issuers cannot be understated—on average, corporations issue over $1 
trillion in bonds each year, seven times the amount raised by these entities 
through the issuance of common stock.24 Repealing the ban on CACs would 
result in lower interest rates, thereby reducing the cost of capital for issuers, 
the vast majority of which primarily rely on the bond markets to conduct 
their financing activities.25  
 
 22  In Europe, for example, under the terms of the Treaty on the European Stability Mechanism, all 
sovereign bonds issued after January 1, 2013 must include a CAC. See Christian Hofmann, Sovereign-
Debt Restructuring in Europe Under the New Model Collective Action Clauses, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 385, 
393 (2014). 
 23  See infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
 24  For the years 2012 through 2014, U.S. corporations issued approximately $3.9 trillion in bonds, 
seven times the amount of stock issued by these entities. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. 
SYS,.New Security Issues, U.S. Corporations, (Dec. 28, 2015), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/corpsecure/corpsecure20151231.htm.  
 25  There are various caveats to transplanting lessons drawn from the experience in Chile to the 
United States given the distinguishing features in the legal and institutional frameworks that govern the 
corporate bond markets in these two countries. It is not clear, however, how these differing features 
would affect the value of including a CAC. For example, one may expect the effectiveness and 
efficiency of bankruptcy laws to affect parties’ preferences regarding the inclusion of a CAC, as well as 
the values of these clauses. Cross-country surveys and studies have found the Chilean bankruptcy 
system to be less efficient than the U.S. system, ranking the bankruptcy system of Chile at 102, 
respectively, while the United States is ranked at 17. See World Bank Group, Resolving Insolvency, 
DOING BUSINESS (June 2015), http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/resolving-insolvency. 
In fact, in order to improve the efficiency of its bankruptcy system, Chile recently enacted a new 
insolvency law that became effective on October 2014. Law No. 20720, Octubre 10, 2014, DIARIO 
OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). For a description of Law No. 20720, see Pedro A. Jimenez, Rodolfo Pittaluga 
Jr. & Pablo Herrera, Chile’s New Insolvency Law: Restructured for Corporate Restructurings, INSOL 
INT’L SPECIAL REPORT (Oct. 2014), 
https://www.insol.org/_files/TechnicalSeries/Special%20Reports/Special%20Report%20on%20Chile%2
0-%2026%20September%202014.pdf. The fact that the Chilean bankruptcy system is less efficient than 
the U.S. system suggests that avoiding bankruptcy and its related costs (one of the benefits associated 
with CACs) should be more valuable in Chile than in the United States. See infra Part IV.A Another 
distinguishing feature can be the size and depth of the corporate bond markets. Less liquid capital 
markets in developing economies may be characterized by higher concentrations of bond ownership. 
And if ownership concentration is too high, then a single bondholder could in effect possess a veto 
power, thus frustrating the purpose of a CAC. This is probably not a major concern in Chile, where 
qualifying majorities in CACs have been set by parties at 75%, thus making a 25% ownership of the 
entire bond issue necessary to have such a veto power. See infra note 102. The fact that Chilean 
corporate bonds may be characterized by higher levels of ownership concentration than those bonds 
issued by U.S. companies, suggests that the value of a CAC (which facilitate coordination among 
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides an overview of the 
nature of CACs and the reasons why contracting parties may or may not 
choose to adopt these in their agreements. Part III provides an overview of 
the Chilean legal framework governing the use of CACs and the recent 
reforms. A description of the data and the empirical analyses are presented 
in Part IV. Part V discusses the general implications of these findings and 
concludes. 
 II. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CACS  
 A. Financial Distress and CACs 
When an issuer faces financial distress and is unable to meet its debt 
obligations, an orderly restructuring of its outstanding liabilities may 
become necessary to avoid a default. Under these circumstances, a speedy 
and efficient restructuring process better serves issuers and their investors. 
For corporate issuers, a country’s bankruptcy system often provides a last-
resort court-administered framework for firms to restructure their debt and 
continue their operations.26 In general, reorganizations of major public 
companies in bankruptcy court entail expensive and lengthy proceedings, 
which may, in some cases, exacerbate the costs of financial distress and 
destroy firm value.27 The general drawbacks and inefficiencies associated 
with bankruptcy proceedings have been extensively examined in academic 
literature.28  
 
dispersed investors) is likely to be lower in Chile than in the United States. See infra Part IV.A  
 26  In the United States, Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides such a court-administered 
framework. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the 
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 677 (1993). In 
Chile, Law No. 20720 provides the framework for that country’s bankruptcy regime. See supra note 25.  
 27  Estimates of the average length of bankruptcy reorganization proceedings in the United States 
range from fourteen to twenty-nine months. See, e.g., Vicki L. Bogan & Chad M. Sandler, Are Firms on 
the Right Page with Chapter 11? An Analysis of Firm Choices that Contribute to Post-Bankruptcy 
Survival, 19 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 609, 612 (2012) (providing an estimate of between 14 and 16 
months); Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation versus 
Chapter 11 Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253, 1270 (2006) (providing an estimate of between twenty-
eight and twenty-nine months); Diane K. Denis & Kimberly J. Rodgers, Chapter 11: Duration, Outcome 
and Post-Reorganization Performance, 42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 101, 105 (2007) 
(providing an estimate of between eighteen and twenty-two months). Estimates of direct, court declared 
expenses, such as professional legal costs, range from 1.4% to 1.9% of the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy 
assets. See, e.g., Bris et. al, supra at 1279 (providing an estimate of 1.9%); Lynn M. LoPucki and Joseph 
W. Doherty, The Determinants of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 1 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 113 (2004) (providing an estimate of 1.4%); Stephen J. Lubben, The 
Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of Professional Fees in Large 
Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L. J. 509, 540 (2000) (providing an estimate of 1.8%); Stephen J. 
Lubben, Corporate Reorganization and Professional Fees, 82 AM. BANKR. L. J. 77, 78 (2008) 
(providing an estimate of 1.8%). 
 28  See generally, Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL 
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Out of court, privately negotiated restructurings offer a less expensive 
and more efficient alternative relative to bankruptcy proceedings.29 In a 
privately negotiated restructuring, or workout, creditors may extend the 
maturity date, forgive interest payments, or exchange their debt claims for 
an equity stake in the issuer. To the extent that they are more efficient than 
court administered bankruptcy proceedings, workouts can reduce the costs 
of financial distress, better preserving the value of a financially distressed, 
but otherwise economically viable, company.30 Empirically, the question of 
whether such private renegotiations are more efficient and effective than 
bankruptcy proceedings is an open one. A number of studies have found 
that workout offers from insolvent firms succeed less than 50% of the 
time31 and that corporations in serious financial distress appear to enter 
 
STUD. 127 (1986); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 
YALE L. J. 1043 (1992); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization 
Remain A Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L. J. 
153 (2004).  
 29  See, e.g., Conrad B. Duberstein, Out-of-Court Workouts, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 347, 347–
48 (1993) (arguing that an out-of-court workout can avoid the costs, delay, and aggravation of a litigious 
Chapter 11); Stuart C. Gilson, Kose John and Larry H.P. Lang, Troubled Debt Restructurings: An 
Empirical Study of Private Reorganizations of Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 315, 319 (1990) 
(positing that the direct costs of Chapter 11 are higher than the direct costs of private negotiation 
because the complexity and procedural demands of Chapter 11 increase attorneys’ fees and other 
indirect costs such as management time devoted to restructuring); Bettina M. Whyte & Patricia D. 
Tilton, Turnarounds: Pursuing a Dual Path, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 28 (1995) (stating that out-of-
court workouts preferable to Chapter 11 proceedings due to the latter’s cost, image, drain on resources, 
and impact on morale, among other factors). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy 
Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411, 415 (1990); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 26, at 677; John 
McConnell & Henri Servaes, The Economics of Pre-Packaged Bankruptcy, in CORPORATE 
BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 322, 322 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. 
Weiss eds., 1996). 
 30  See Julian R. Franks and Walter N. Torous, A Comparison of Financial Recontracting in 
Distressed Exchanges and Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 349, 355 (1994) (“Distressed 
exchanges require significantly less time than Chapter 11 reorganizations: a median workout period of 
seventeen months, compared with a median of twenty-seven months for Chapter 11 reorganizations.”); 
Stuart C. Gilson, Managing Default: Some Evidence on How Firms Choose Between Workouts and 
Chapter 11, in CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 308, 319 (J. Bhandari 
ed., 1996) (“[d]istressed firms can preserve more of their value by restructuring their debt privately,” 
and “the professional fees incurred in exchange offers are about one-tenth of those incurred in a typical 
chapter 11 case”); Karen H. Wruck, Financial Distress, Reorganization and Organizational Efficiency, 
27 J. FIN. ECON. 419, 436 (1990) (estimating out of pocket costs of restructuring to be about ten times 
lower in private workouts relative to bankruptcy proceedings). Even Bankruptcy courts have long 
recognized the advantages of private workouts. See, e.g., In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014, 1014–
16 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (listing the advantages of out-of-court workouts relative to bankruptcy 
proceedings).  
 31  See Franks & Touros, supra note 30, at 358 (“These firm recovery rates are significantly smaller 
in Chapter 11 reorganizations, a median of 50.9%, than in distressed exchanges, with a median of 80.1% 
. indicating that Chapter 11 firms are far less solvent at the end of reorganizations than firms which 
restructure their debt privately.”); Robert Gertner & David Sharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the 
Effects of Reorganization Law, 46 J. FIN. 1189, 1191 (1991) (showing initial settlement rates of 73 out 
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bankruptcy proceedings without attempting a private workout.32  
Various hurdles may hinder the ability of issuers and bondholders to 
successfully implement a private, out-of-court workout. An efficient 
workout proposal may not be successfully implemented if a number of 
creditors opportunistically opt to stay out of the workout arrangement.33 
Such “holdout” bondholder hopes to profit from the willingness of the non-
holdout bondholders to compromise with the issuer, by letting the latter 
bear the expense of financing the survival of the issuer (e.g., by extending 
the maturity or agreeing to a principal reduction) while demanding it be 
paid under the original, more favorable terms.34 Even though each creditor 
by itself is not individually critical for the success of a workout, a 
substantial number of holdouts may collectively dissuade other creditors 
from agreeing to participate in an otherwise efficient and desirable workout 
proposal.35 And, if enough bondholders refuse to cooperate in response to 
 
of 156 for junk bond issues); Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence 
on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355, 356 
(1990) (showing private debt restructuring of 50 out of 111 publicly traded companies that experienced 
financial distress); Gilson et al., supra note 29, at 326 (showing private restructurings for 80 public 
companies out of sample of 169 that experienced financial distress).  
 32  See Lynn M. Lopucki, The Debtor in Full Control: Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L. J. 99, 116 (1983) (noting that none of forty-eight bankrupt 
companies analyzed in a study had attempted workouts) and J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy 
Bargain: National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 213, 232 (1991) (noting that 
workouts are generally not attempted by firms that later file for bankruptcy).  
 33  See Gertner & Scharfstein, supra note 31, at 1191 (“[creditors] with small stakes have an 
incentive to hold out”); Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L. J. 232, 236 
(1987) (noting that the buoy-up effect for the holdouts causes workout attempts to fail); see also Gilson, 
supra note 31, at 316; Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36. J. L. & ECON. 595, 
596 (1993).  
 34  Consider, as an illustration, a series of bonds with $100 million aggregate principal amount 
outstanding which mature in one year. The financially distressed issuer knows that it will be unable to 
repay the principal in a timely manner and has proposed a restructuring in which investors would 
exchange their existing bonds for a new series of bonds which mature in two years and which will bear a 
lower principal amount (e.g., each old bond with $1,000 face value would be exchanged for a new bond 
with $800 face value). If the firm is able to restructure at least 90% of the outstanding bonds in this 
manner it will survive; however, if the restructuring fails, it will seek bankruptcy protection and 
bondholders will receive fifty cents on the dollar (i.e., $500 for each bond worth $1,000 face value). 
Given this scenario, a single bondholder that owns $1 million in aggregate principal amount of the 
distressed bonds is likely to reject the exchange. If it agrees and the restructuring is successful he 
receives $800,000 million repayment in full in a year; while if the restructuring fails it receives 
$500,000. However, if he rejects the proposal and the restructuring is successful he receives his $1 
million repayment in full; while if the restructuring fails he receives $500,000. 
 35  This results from the fact that the exchanging bondholders might be made worse off, since they 
help assure (and effectively fund) payment to the holdouts. If the resulting subsidy to the non-
exchanging bondholders is greater than their savings in avoided bankruptcy costs, each bondholder is 
better off refusing to participate, but still better off if all participated. See Roe, supra note 33, at 279. 
This problem can be exacerbated by specialized hedge funds that purchase bonds on the secondary 
market after the onset of distress at a deep discount and then play non-cooperatively to extract further 
concessions from the issuer, thus increasing the potential subsidy to holdouts and endangering the 
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the incentives of some to hold out, the workout proposal will ultimately fail. 
Including a CAC in the debt agreement between the issuer and 
bondholders is one possible ex-ante contractual response to the holdout 
problem. CACs allow a qualifying majority of the bondholders (excluding 
securities held by the issuer or its insiders) to consent to modifications to 
the core provisions of the terms and conditions of a bond issue (such as the 
maturity, interest, principal) in a manner that is binding on all bondholders, 
including dissenting ones.36 This voting mechanism can help solve the 
holdout problem—a qualified majority vote that is binding on all 
bondholders, reassures each and every individual bondholder that if it 
consents to the terms of a proposed workout, others will not profit at the 
consenting bondholder’s expense by holding out.37 
By deterring selfish, strategic behavior by holdout investors and 
facilitating the coordination of dispersed bondholders willing to participate 
in a workout, CACs can lead to welfare gains and enhance value in post-
default scenarios.38 However, even if CACs are indeed optimal conditional 
on default, it does not necessarily follow that the adoption of these clauses 
maximizes the ex-ante contracting surplus. To the extent they reduce the 
costs associated with financial distress, the inclusion of CACs may create 
perverse incentives for the issuer, potentially incentivizing it to 
opportunistically engage in more risky behavior, which may very well 
 
success of the exchange offer. See John C. Coffee & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The 
Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 
1207–14 (1991). In the sovereign debt markets, these hedge funds have played a key role in the ongoing 
saga of the restructuring of Argentina’s debt. See Benedict Mander, Cristina Fernández Holds out for 
Victory in Debt Battle, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015, 2:21 PM), http://on.ft.com/1xsSEZA. 
 36  See Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-Off Between Individual and 
Collective Rights, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040, 1054–56 (2002) (describing the holdout problem and noting 
that holding out is not possible when a majority of bondholders can bind dissenting bondholders to a 
restructuring plan). 
 37  See Gertner & Scharfstein, supra note 31, at 1211 (arguing that these types of voting procedure 
can help issuers and investors “get around the holdout . problem”); Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. 
Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
1357, 1374 (2000) (noting that the inability to bind dissenting creditors which creates holdout problems 
in out-of-court workouts is critical difference between out-of-court restructuring and Chapter 11). 
 38  See, e.g., Jeremy I. Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff, A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign 
Debt, 97 J. POL. ECON. 155–78 (1989); Kenneth M. Kletzer, Sovereign Bond Restructuring: Collective 
Action Clauses and Official Crisis Intervention, in FIXING FINANCIAL CRISES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
230, 233 (Andrew G. Haldane ed., 2004) (arguing that CACs improve welfare relative to unanimous 
consent clauses); Kenneth M. Kletzer and Benjamin D. Wright, Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter, 
90 AM. ECON. REV. 621–39 (2000). However, it should be noted that this is not necessarily a universally 
held view. See, e.g., Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, supra note 33, at 597–99 
(arguing that CACs may provide insolvent issuers with an incentive to make the least generous credible 
offer, i.e., in which the firm keeps a large share of the gains, leaving creditors with a smaller share than 
that implied by the bankruptcy priority order, which may lead to a protracted process of offers and 
counteroffers). 
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increase the probability of default. 39 Rational investors who are aware of 
this moral hazard problem would either demand a unanimous action clause 
(UAC), which requires that any modification to the core terms of the bond 
issue be approved by all bondholders, or agree to the inclusion of a CAC 
together with appropriate compensation for the excess risk in the form of 
higher interest rates.40  
For the most part, corporate issuers and investors in the United States 
are not afforded the flexibility of deciding whether or not to include a CAC 
in their indenture agreements. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA),41 
which governs public issues of debt in the United States, regulates the 
contractual terms that may be incorporated in an indenture agreement,42 
including those relating to the amendments of the terms and conditions of 
the bonds.43 The TIA requires that modifications of core provisions such as 
the principal balance, interest rate, or the schedule of debt repayments be 
consented to by each and every single bondholder.44 As a result, CACs 
 
 39  See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Do Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing 
Costs?, 114 ECON. J. 247, 248–49 (2004); Torbjörn Becker, Anthony Richards & Yunyong 
Thaicharoen, Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?, 61 J. 
INT’L. ECON. 127, 128 (2003). 
 40  Even “high quality” issuers for which this moral hazard problem is minimal may not be willing 
to propose including a CAC because of the possible adverse signaling effect (i.e., “disclosing” a higher 
probability of future financial problems and willingness to exploit a CAC mechanism) and the resulting 
increase in the interest rate. See Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signalling, 23 RAND J. 
ECON. 432, 439 (1992) (showing that the signaling effect of bargaining proposals is stronger when the 
proposal is made by a more informed party); Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness 
of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 654–57 (2006) (noting that this effect is likely to be 
stronger in cases where an unfamiliar term being proposed and that opting out proposals are even more 
suspicious when the default is very common, further weakening the incentive of any party to propose 
such deviations); Roe, Voting Prohibition, supra note 33, at 277.  
 41  Trust Indenture Act of 1939 §§ 301–302, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77aaa–77bbb (West 2016). Offerings 
exempt under Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and Rule 144A promulgated 
thereunder are not subject to the TIA. Id. § 304(b), § 77ddd(b). In addition, most provisions of the TIA 
do not apply to a number of other exempt offerings under the Securities Act, such as Section 3(a)(3) 
commercial paper and bonds issued by sovereign governments. Id. § 304(a), § 77ddd(a). 
 42  In the United States, public debt offerings in excess of $10 million require the use of a trust 
indenture, an agreement between the issuer and a trustee representing the bondholder’s interests. Id. §§ 
304–305, §§ 77ddd–77eee. For a description of the role played by indentures and the types of provisions 
contained therein see infra notes 139–143 and accompanying text. If the TIA applies to a debt issuance, 
the governing indenture must be “qualified” with the SEC before any sales of the securities can be made. 
Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 306, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77fff (West 2016). As part of this qualification 
process, various substantive provisions are deemed to be automatically incorporated into the indenture. 
Id. § 318(c), § 77rrr(c). 
 43  Generally, non-substantive amendments may be approved by the holders of a majority of the 
outstanding bonds, or, if required under the terms of the indenture, by a higher majority. Id. § 316(a)(1), 
§ 77ppp(a)(1). However, they may not choose a lower one. If they do, the indenture will be 
automatically qualified as requiring a simple majority. Id. If the indenture is silent on this regard, a 
simple majority is sufficient to authorize such binding amendments. Id. 
 44  Id. § 316(b), § 77ppp(b). This requirement that an indenture may not provide for the amendment 
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cannot be included in corporate bonds that are publicly issued in the United 
States, a prohibition that can lead to inefficient and unnecessary 
bankruptcies, exacerbating as a result the costs of financial distress.45 Ex 
ante, the higher expected costs associated with financial distress could be 
reflected in higher interest rates, which increases the cost of capital for 
companies. In response to the higher costs that result from this ban on 
CACs, market participants have strategically developed less efficient and 
effective alternatives to the privately negotiated workout, such as the exit-
consent offer46 and the pre-packaged bankruptcy.47 Motivated in great part 
 
of any core term by means of a vote of a majority (or super majority) of bondholders is a mandatory 
rule, which parties cannot agree to modify by a contractual arrangement and that applies despite their 
desire to contract around it. Section 316(a)(2) of the TIA provides a limited exception, allowing an 
indenture to contain a provision authorizing the holders of not less than 75% in principal amount to 
consent on behalf of all holders to the postponement of any interest payment for a period not exceeding 
three years from its due date. Amendments to non-core terms must be approved by the holders of a 
majority of the outstanding bonds, unless the terms of the indenture, by a higher majority. Id. § 
316(a)(1), § 77ppp(a)(1).  
 45  See Kahan, supra note 36, at 1055–56; Roe, supra note 33, at 233, 250–52 (“[F]inancial stress 
creates problems that current bond regulation exacerbates . . By prohibiting a binding vote among 
bondholders, the Trust Indenture Act makes a recapitalization more likely to fail than it would otherwise 
be.”).  
 46  In an exchange offer and consent solicitation, the bondholders that agree to the new proposed 
core terms consent to an exit amendment stripping certain nonpayment covenants from the governing 
indenture prior to exchanging their bonds. For a brief description of the role played by indenture 
covenants in corporate debt see infra notes 139–45 and accompanying text. The purpose of the binding 
amendments authorized by the tendering holders in their exit consents is to reduce the value of the 
existing bonds that non-tendering holders will continue to own, thus incentivizing all holders to tender 
(thus agreeing to the amendments). Although exchange offers conditioned on such exit consents have 
been used as a substitute for CACs, they do not effectively eliminate the holdout problem and their use 
raises a number of potential problems as they are coercive in nature and could be abused by an issuer. 
See Antonio E. Bernardo & Eric L. Talley, Investment Policy and Exit Exchange Offers Within 
Financially Distressed Firms, 51 J. FIN. 871, 881 (1996) (arguing that managers, acting strategically on 
behalf of shareholders, may select inefficient investment projects to enhance their positions against 
creditors in a debt-for-debt exit exchange exit-consents offer); Gertner & Scharfstein, supra note 31, at 
1191 (noting that, due to the TIA, public debt restructurings almost always involve an exchange of new 
securities and cash for the original debt); Roe, supra note 33, at 247 (maintaining that an exit consent is 
not assured of diminishing the buoying-up effect accompanying the holdout problem).  
 47  In a prepackaged bankruptcy, the issuer and a majority of bondholders negotiate a restructuring 
plan prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition. If an initial attempt to implement such plan fails, those 
minority holders who did not consent will nonetheless be bound once the bankruptcy court, with the 
prior approval of two thirds of the bondholders, enters an order binding the entire group to the plan. See 
11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1126(c), 1129(a)(8) (West 2016). For an overview of procedures involved in a pre-
packaged bankruptcy see Elizabeth Tashjian, Ronald C. Lease & John J. McConell, Prepacks: An 
Empirical Analysis of Prepackaged Bankruptcies, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 135, 137–139 (1996) (generally 
characterizing pre-packaged bankruptcies as a hybrid form of restructuring with features of a Chapter 11 
reorganization and out-of-court workouts). There is evidence that indicates that pre-packaged 
bankruptcies may be more efficient than bankruptcy proceedings, but less efficient than private 
workouts. See id. at 141–43 (finding that pre-vote prepacks take less time in reorganization and are less 
costly); GORDON BERMANT, ARLENE JORGENSEN HILLESTAD & AARON KERRY, CHAPTER 11 VENUE 
CHOICE BY LARGE PUBLIC COMPANIES - REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE 
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by these increased costs, a number of scholars have called for the repeal of 
the TIA’s prohibition of CACs, arguing that the holdout problem that 
complicates private workouts and restructurings can be minimized by the 
inclusion of such clauses in trust indentures.48  
 B. CACs and the Cost of Capital 
Whether the benefits of including a CAC (i.e., quicker and less costly 
reorganizations that preserve the value of a distressed firm) exceed the 
potential costs (i.e., the incentive of issuers to take actions that increase the 
chances of a reorganization becoming necessary or to coerce investors in 
the course of such reorganization) is likely to hinge on the particular 
circumstances surrounding a particular bond offering.49 If the expected 
efficiencies in future debt restructurings associated with the inclusion of 
CACs in the indenture governing a bond issue outweigh the associated 
costs, one could expect to observe a negative correlation between the 
presence of a CAC and the interest rate demanded by the investors 
purchasing an issuer’s bonds.50  
Empirical studies examining the relationship between CACs and 
interest rate spreads have yielded mixed results—while some of these 
studies have found a price effect associated with the presence of a CAC, 
others have found little or no impact.51 In one of the earliest studies, 
Tsatsaronis found that spreads for sovereign bonds issued under New York 
law (a proxy for the absence of a CAC) had lower spreads than bonds 
issued under English law bonds (a proxy for the presence of a CAC), 
 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 39–40 (1997), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ch11venu.pdf/$file/ch11venu.pdf (noting that the academic 
consensus is that pre-packaged cases cost more than out-of-court workouts but less than full Chapter 11 
cases). 
 48  See Carlos Berdejo, Revisiting the Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 89 TUL. L. REV. 541, 
598–601 (2015) (proposing a rule where the default is a simple majority, but in which parties can 
contract around this default by selecting a higher threshold in their indentures); Robert A. Haugen & 
Lemma W. Senbet, Bankruptcy and Agency Costs: Their Significance to the Theory of Optimal Capital 
Structure, 23 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 27, 30 (1988); Roe, supra note 33, at 235, 249, 270–71 
(proposing a two-thirds majority voting requirement, excluding insider bonds).  
 49  See, e.g., Sayantan Ghosal & Kannika Thampanishvong, Does Strengthening Collective Action 
Clauses (CACs) Help?, 89 J. INT’L ECON. 68, 68–71 (2013). 
 50  See William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of 
Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 47–48 (2004). The extent to which the interest would decline will 
depend on the relative bargaining power of the issuer and investors as they share the additional surplus.  
 51  See generally Sönke Häseler, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bonds - 
Whence the Opposition?, 23 J. ECON. SURV. 882 (2009); Sönke Häseler, Trustees versus Fiscal Agents 
and Default Risk, 34 EUR. J. L. ECON. 425 (2012) (conducting a meta-analysis and finding no systematic 
evidence of either a spread premium or higher actual default rates for bonds with collective enforcement 
rights).  
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though the difference was not statistically significant.52 A different 
conclusion was reached by Eichengreen and Mody who examined corporate 
and sovereign emerging market bonds issued under New York and English 
laws and found that CACs reduced the cost of borrowing for more 
creditworthy issuers but increased it for less creditworthy issuers.53 
However, Becker et al. were unable to document such a relationship 
between CACs and the creditworthiness of the issuer in their study, finding 
that bonds issued under English law (presumably containing CACs) were 
characterized by lower spreads, although this effect was not statistically 
significant.54 Similarly, in their empirical work, Gugiatti and Richards 
concluded that CACs had no economic or statistically significant impact on 
bond prices and found no significant differences between the yields of low 
and high rated issuers that adopt CACs.55 A more recent set of studies by 
Bradley et al. and Bradley and Gulati found that the presence of CACs 
reduced the spreads of sovereign bonds, and that this reduction was larger 
for less creditworthy issuers.56 In another recent study, Bardozzeti and 
Dottori found that the inclusion of CACs reduced the yields of sovereign 
issuers with mid-range credit ratings, but had no effect on the yields of the 
highest or lowest rated issuers.57  
 
 52  Kostas Tsatsaronis, The Effect of Collective Action Clauses on Sovereign Bond Spreads, BIS Q. 
REV., Nov. 1999, at 22, www.bis.org/publ/r_qt9911.pdf (last visited May 13, 2016). 
 53  Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Do Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?, 114 
ECON. J. 247, 249 (2004). To explain this result, the authors argue that while more creditworthy issuers 
benefit from the ability of being able to conduct a private workout if it became necessary, less 
creditworthy issuers need a unanimity rule as a commitment device to convince creditors of their 
willingness to repay and not take unnecessarily risky actions. Id. 
 54  See Torbjörn Becker, Anthony Richards & Yunyong Thaicharoen, Bond Restructuring and 
Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?, 61 J. INT’L. ECON. 127, 158 (2003). While 
Tsatsaroni and Eichengreen and Mody used launch spread data, Becker et al. use secondary market data. 
Notably, the authors find that the relationship between CACs and spreads vary through time. In their 
1998 data, English law bonds command significantly lower yields than bonds governed by other laws, 
an effect which appears to be entirely driven just by high-rated borrowers; however, in their 2000 data, 
high-rated borrowers paid a significant yield premium while less creditworthy borrowers were granted a 
significant discount and overall, there was no significant relationship between the inclusion of a CAC 
and bond spreads. A subsequent study seeks to explain these inter-temporal differences, arguing that 
when market sentiment on emerging market debt is poor, all but the most highly rated borrowers are 
penalized for the use of CACs; but when investors are enthusiastic about emerging markets, CACs 
reduce spreads for all but the least creditworthy issuers. See Barry J. Eichengreen, Kenneth M. Kletzer 
& Ashoka Mody, Crisis Resolution: Next Steps, 18–24 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 03-
196, 2003). 
 55  Mark Gugiatti & Anthony Richards, Do Collective Action Clauses Influence Bond Yields? New 
Evidence from Emerging Markets, 6 INT’L. FIN. 415, 441 (2003). 
 56  See Michael Bradley, James D. Cox & Mitu Gulati, The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and 
Their Antidotes: Lessons from the Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 310 (2010); Michael 
Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone, 18 REV. FIN. 2045, 2046 (2014). 
 57  See Alfredo Bardozzeti & Davide Dottori, Collective Action Clauses: How do they Affect 
Sovereign Bond Yields?, 92 J. INT’L. FIN. 286, 287 (2014). According to the authors this non-linear 
relationship is due to the fact that high rated issuers have a low probability of default (thus reducing the 
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For someone approaching this question from a corporate finance 
perspective, these studies suffer two key methodological limitations.58 First, 
the vast majority of these studies have used the governing law of the bond 
(namely New York or English law) as a proxy for the presence of a CAC 
without reviewing the underlying contractual instruments for each bond 
issue. Thus, the variation used in identifying the effect of CACs came 
ultimately from variations in the governing law of the instrument, not on the 
presence of the clause itself.59 Moreover, the governing law of an 
instrument is an imperfect proxy for the presence of a CAC. Bonds issued 
under English law, which traditionally has allowed parties to include CACs, 
can contain a UAC if they parties so prefer.60 It is true that traditionally 
most bonds issued under New York law, including those issued by 
sovereign and other international borrowers, did not include CACs.61 
However, the TIA ban on CACs does not apply to bonds issued by foreign 
governments,62 and bonds issued by foreign corporations are likely to be 
exempt from this provision of the TIA to the extent that they are not 
publicly offered in the United States.63 Thus, the traditional absence of 
CACs in bonds issued by sovereign and other international borrowers under 
New York law was the result of a standard developed by the market, which 
 
value of an efficient restructuring) and low rated issuers are suspected of moral hazard to a greater 
degree by the market. Id. at 299. 
 58  By “corporate finance perspective” I refer to the general goal of this Article, which is to 
understand how the decision whether or not to include a CAC can affect the cost of capital of companies 
from the same country that operate under the same set of laws. Gaining such insight is important not just 
in evaluating the recent reforms in Germany and Chile, which mostly affected public debt issued by 
corporate issuers in these countries, but also in assessing the economic costs of the existing ban of CACs 
under U.S. law and the potential benefits from its repeal. See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text 
(discussing the German reform), infra notes 80–83 and accompanying text (discussing the Chilean 
reform) and supra notes 41–48 and accompanying text (describing the existing U.S. legal regime 
governing the use of CAC in public corporate debt). 
 59  This poses a problem insofar as issuers may have differing reasons to choose a given governing 
law and laws will differ in various dimensions (unrelated to the use CACs) which effect may be 
confounded with that associated with the adoption of a CAC in any particular transaction. A better 
empirical strategy would look at a series of bonds governed by the same law but which differ in their 
adoption of CACs. See Bradley & Gulati, Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone, supra note 56, at 
2046, 2073. However, most of this variation in the context of sovereign debt comes from bonds issued 
under New York law before and after 2003, thus potentially confounding the effects of CACs with 
cross-sectional time trends in sovereign spreads. See infra notes 64 and 67. 
 60  See infra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
 61  See supra notes 41–48 and accompanying text.  
 62  TIA § 304(a)(6) exempts bonds issued by foreign governments from its provision. Trust 
Indenture Act of 1939 § 304(a)(6), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77ddd(a) (West 2016). 
 63  Offerings exempt under Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and Rule 
144A promulgated thereunder are not subject to the TIA. See Id. § 304(b), § 77ddd(b). For example, 
Berdejo finds that in a sample of 25 bonds issued by German corporations during the period 2010–2012 
under U.S. law that trade on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange, 23 include a CAC. See Berdejo, supra 
note 48 at 570.  
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in fact recently changed.64 The importance of this imperfect match between 
governing law and use or non-use of CACs in sovereign bonds for the 
interpretation of the results found in the literature is carefully discussed by 
Gugiatti and Richards.65 More recent studies examining the impact of CACs 
have sought to address this issue—Bardozzetti and Dottori rely on 
Bloomberg’s coding of the absence or presence of a CAC,66 while Bradley 
et al. and Bradley and Gulati review offering prospectuses and circulars to 
better identify the presence of a CAC.67  
Another key limitation of the existing literature is the compositions of 
the samples analyzed therein, which mostly or entirely consist of emerging 
market sovereign bonds. We should expect CACs to play significantly 
different roles in the restructuring of corporate and sovereign debt for a 
number of reasons. First, the relevance of the interplay of CACs and issuer 
moral hazard in the context of sovereign debt markets is, at least 
theoretically, an open question. For example, the presence of the 
International Monetary Fund and its interest to launch bailouts to avoid 
cross-border financial crises may lead sovereign lenders to believe they are 
likely to be paid in full, making the presence of CACs less relevant in 
determining spreads.68 This could make CACs less relevant in sovereign 
bonds, making differences in the spread of yields of bonds with and without 
CACs somewhat uninformative.69 Second, the legal framework that governs 
a post-default state of the world is starkly different for corporate and 
 
 64  Prior to 2003 nearly all sovereign debt issued under New York law contained UACs. See 
generally Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow of the 
International Order, 53 EMORY L.J. 691 (2004); Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds 
and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317 (2002). In response to crises in Mexico and Argentina, the 
United States Treasury Department recommended that sovereign bonds governed by New York law be 
issued under indentures containing CACs for the amendment of payment terms, a recommendation that 
was quickly embraced by market participants. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in 
Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1627, 1649–60 (2006) (discussing the events 
surrounding the adoption of CACs in bonds governed by New York law); Sean Hagan, Designing a 
Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INTL. L. 295 (2005); Randal Quarles, 
Herding Cats: Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Debt, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (2010). 
Bradley and Gulati report that while less than 10% of the sovereign bonds issued under New York law 
during 1990–2002 include CACs, by 2010, over 90% of all New York-law governed bonds contained 
such clauses. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 56 at 2049–55. 
 65  Mark Gugiatti & Anthony Richards, The Use of Collective Action Clauses in New York Law 
Bonds of Sovereign Borrowers, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 814, 820 (2004). The authors identify almost $12 
billion of sovereign bonds issued between 1991 and 2003 that are governed by the laws of New York 
but nonetheless contain CACs. 
 66  See Bardozzetti & Dottori, supra note 57, at 288.  
 67  See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 56, at 2055.  
 68  See Federico Weinschelbaum & Jose Wynne, Renegotiation, Collective Action Clauses and 
Sovereign Debt Markets, 67 J. INT’L. ECON. 47, 49–50. (2005).  
 69  In fact, there is anecdotal evidence indicating that investors and the market pay very little 
attention to CACs when pricing sovereign bonds. See Häseler, Collective Action Clauses in 
International Sovereign Bonds, supra note 51 at 905–06. 
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sovereign lenders. Holders of bonds issued by sovereigns have little 
recourse to a reliable enforcement authority since the courts of a defaulting 
sovereign are unlikely to enforce the bondholder’s claim.70 And, given that 
there is no bankruptcy-type regime for sovereigns, a sovereign, unlike a 
corporate borrower, cannot be liquidated, nor a bankruptcy court mandated 
capital restructuring (for example, reducing the principal to be repaid) be 
effected at the expense of the equity holders, as in corporate 
reorganizations.71  
The sample analyzed in this Article addresses these limitations and 
presents a unique setting in which the effects of CACs on interest rate 
spreads can be analyzed and isolated.72 First, the sample consists entirely of 
bonds issued by corporate entities. Thus, the analyses can control for a 
variety of issuer characteristics (such as leverage, size, etc.) in addition to 
credit rating (the control commonly used in studies of sovereign debt).73 
Moreover, indentures for corporate bond issues (unlike those for sovereign 
bonds) include a variety of provisions restricting issuer behavior which can 
further our understanding of the role of CACs in determining bond 
spreads.74 Second, all the corporations that issued the bonds appearing in 
the sample are from one country, Chile. This means that the legal and 
regulatory framework affecting issuers (e.g., corporate law, securities law, 
bankruptcy law, antitrust laws, etc.) is the same for all issuers in the 
sample.75 This, of course, is not the case in studies that include issuers from 
different countries. 
 
 70  Aggrieved bondholders may still bring their claims in the courts of a third country, likely the 
United States or the United Kingdom, and try to attach assets owned by the sovereign located abroad – 
though it is unlikely they will find any significant assets. See William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, 
Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004). Creditors 
may also seek to obtain a judgment that limits the ability of the sovereign to transact in the international 
financial markets hoping to coerce the sovereign into repaying. This is the strategy that has been 
followed by some of the holders of restructured Peruvian and Argentinean bonds in recent years. See 
Bradley et al., The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their Antidotes, supra note 56 at 291–94; 
Michael Elaine Moore & Philip Stafford, Argentina in Last-Ditch Manoeuvre to Pay Bondholders, FIN. 
TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015, 7:41 PM). 
 71  See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 70 at 11; Steven Schwarcz, The Idiots Guide to Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring, 53 EMORY L. J. 1189 (2004). In addition, corporate issuers have developed alternatives 
outside bankruptcy and the use of CACs to restructure their debt. See Bernardo & Talley, supra note 46 
and accompanying text. 
 72  For a description of the sample see infra Part III.B. 
 73  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 74  See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 75  See supra note 25. 
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 III. OVERVIEW OF CHILEAN LAW & THE DATASET 
 A. The Chilean Legal Regime and Reform 
The Chilean Securities Market Law (LMVC) sets forth the legal 
framework for the issuance of public debt instruments in Chile.76 Debt 
instruments issued by non-financial companies with maturities longer than 
thirty-six months must be registered with the Superintendencia de Valores y 
Seguros (SVS), a Chilean administrative agency with duties analogous to 
those of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.77 Among 
the documents that an issuer must file with the SVS is the contrato de 
emision, an agreement between the issuer and the bondholders’ 
representative that contains the terms and conditions of a bond issue 
(hereinafter “indenture”); a prospectus, providing a summary of the terms 
and conditions of the instrument; basic information on the issuer; and two 
credit rating certificates.78 The contents of the indenture are regulated in 
part by the LMVC and by rules promulgated by the SVS, which require 
certain provisions and terms to be included therein.79  
The process of amending the terms and conditions of a bond issue are 
among the items regulated by the LMVC. Under the original version of 
Article 125 of the LMVC (Old Article 125), enacted in 1994, changes to 
certain core terms, such as the interest rate, principal amount and maturity, 
required the unanimous consent of the holders of each and every 
outstanding bond.80 Notably, this framework paralleled the one established 
in the United States under the TIA.81 Old Article 125 was amended in 2007 
to allow CACs in the indentures governing corporate bond issues.82 Under 
 
 76  See generally Law No. 18405 art. 103, Octubre 22, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). For an 
overview of the Chilean corporate bond market and its development in recent years, see Matias Braun & 
Ignacio Briones, Development of the Chilean Corporate Bond Market, in BOND MARKETS IN LATIN 
AMERICA: ON THE VERGE OF A BIG BANG? 151 (Eduardo Borenstein et al. eds., 2008).  
 77  Bonds issued by financial entities must be registered with the Superintendencia de Bancos e 
Instituciones Financieras. See Law No. 18405 arts. 103, 131 Octubre 22, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 
(Chile).  
 78  For a discussion of the terms usually included in indentures and the rationales behind these, see 
infra note 139 and accompanying text.  
 79  See Law No. 18405 art. 104 Octubre 22, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). 
 80  See Old Article 125, at par. 3. Bondholders representing at least two-thirds of the outstanding 
bonds could authorize amendments to non-core terms of the indenture in a manner binding on all 
bondholders, including dissenters. An indenture could provide for a qualified majority greater than two-
thirds of all outstanding bonds, though not a lower one. See Old Article 125, at par. 1, 4. Bonds held by 
the issuer or related persons are not included. See Old Article 125, at par. 2. Old Article 125 was 
incorporated to the LMVC by Law 19301 No. 18(b), art. 1, Marzo 19, 1994 DIARO OFICIAL [D.O.] 
(Chile). See Old Article 125, at par. 1. 
 81  See supra notes 41–48 and accompanying text. 
 82  See Law No. 20190 art. 6(8), Junio 5, 2007 DIARO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). The legislative history 
of the amendments to Article 125 notes the barriers that a unanimity requirement imposes to a debt 
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revised Article 125, the terms and conditions of a bond issue may allow 
bondholders representing at least 75% of the outstanding aggregate 
principal amount to authorize amendments to the interest rate, principal and 
maturity of all the bonds governed by such indenture.83 Parties are still free 
to include a UAC if they so prefer. 84 If the parties opt to include a CAC, the 
indenture may provide for a qualified majority greater than 75% of the 
aggregate principal amount outstanding.85  
Chile is not the only country to have recently amended the laws 
governing the inclusion of CACs in public debt. German law previously 
required that significant amendments to the terms and conditions of a bond 
be approved by each and every holder.86 A more flexible statute, which 
became effective on August 2009, now allows a qualified majority 
representing the holders of at least 75% of the aggregate principal amount 
outstanding to authorize amendments to the core terms and conditions of a 
bond (such as the interest rate, maturity and principal, among others).87 
Although the governing document may provide for a higher qualified 
majority, it may not provide for one that is lower than 75%.88 As in Chile, 
amendments authorized via this mechanism bind all bondholders, including 
dissenters.89 
Adoption of CACs in corporate bond indentures occurred rapidly in 
Chile following the legal reform in that country, a fact that suggests that 
market participants welcomed the flexibility afforded by the legal reform.90 
However, the fact that CACs are being adopted does not necessarily mean 
that their adoption creates value in the underlying transactions.91 If the 
 
restructuring, as well as the need to harmonize the terms of Chilean bonds with those trading in the 
international markets where CACs are common. See BIBLIOTECA DEL CONGRESO NACIONAL, HISTORIA 
DE LA LEY NÚMERO 20.190,,at 947 (2007) (Chile). 
 83  See Law No. 18405 art. 125, Octubre 22, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). Bonds held by 
the issuer are not counted for purposes of authorizing an amendment via bondholder vote. Id.  
 84  Id. 
 85  Id. If the indenture is silent in this regard, any changes to these core terms must be approved by 
all bondholders (i.e., as if a UAC had been agreed to). Id. 
 86  See Jason Grant Allen, More than a Matter of Trust: The German Debt Securities Act 2009 in 
International Perspective, 7 CAP. MKT’S. L.J. 55, 61 (2012). 
 87  See Gesetz über Schuldverschreibungen aus Gesamtemissionen [Schuldverschreibungsgesetz – 
SchVG] [Debenture Act], Aug. 5, 2009, BGBL I at § 4 (Ger.). For a description of the German 
Debenture Act, see Jason Grant Allen, supra note 86; see also Angelo Lercara & Michael Meissner, 
Reform of the German Bond Act and its Impact on the German Debt Capital Market, 6 J. INT’L. 
BANKING L. & REG. 298, 299 (2010).  
 88  See Gesetz über Schuldverschreibungen aus Gesamtemissionen [Schuldverschreibungsgesetz – 
SchVG] [Debenture Act], Aug. 5, 2009, BGBL I at § 5(4) (Ger.). If the governing instrument is silent 
with respect to the amendment of core terms, unanimous consent is required for an amendment of such 
terms. Id. § 5(1). 
 89  See Id. § 5(2). 
 90  See Berdejo, supra note 48, at 560–67. Similarly, adoption of CACs in bonds issued by German 
corporations occurred rather rapidly following the reform. Id. at 563. 
 91  For example, an issuer may use its bargaining power ex ante to negotiate the inclusion of a CAC 
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adoption of a CAC does create value for the contracting parties (by, for 
example, reducing the expected costs of financial distress), one could 
expect to see an effect on the interest rates demanded by the market.92 The 
analyses presented in Section III explore the relationship between the 
inclusion of CACs and the spread demanded by investors. 
 B. Description of the Data 
The sample analyzed in this Article includes all bonds denominated in 
Unidades de Fomento93 with maturities of at least three years issued by 
Chilean corporations between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2013.94 
The SVS website provides certain details for each offering, including the 
issue date, effective interest rate (i.e., initial yield),95 term (maturity) of the 
 
planning to use it when it later encounters financial difficulties to coerce creditors into replacing the 
original terms with less favorable ones. See Kahan, supra note 36, at 1058–59 (noting that when rights 
of bondholders are collective, an issuer may find it easier to coerce bondholders into accepting 
detrimental amendments and that therefore individual bondholders may value their ability to control 
their own destiny in this regard). 
 92  The extent to which the interest would decline will depend on the relative bargaining power of 
the issuer and creditors as they share the additional surplus. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 50 and 
accompanying text.  
 93  Bonds may be issued in Chilean pesos (the country’s legal tender) or in Unidades de Fomento 
(U.F.’s), an indexed unit of account which is defined relative to the Chilean peso. The U.F. was 
introduced in January 1967 to provide an inflation indexed unit of account in which long-term financial 
instruments could be denominated. See Fernando Lefort & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Indexation, Inflation, 
and Monetary Policy: An Overview, in INDEXATION, INFLATION, AND MONETARY POLICY 1, 7 
(Fernando Lefort & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel eds., Central Bank of Chile 2002), 
http://www.bancocentraldechile.cl/eng/studies/central-banking/pdf/v2/001_018Introduccion.pdf. The 
U.F. is linked to the official consumer price index that measures the true cost of living (i.e. inflation) in 
Chile; thus, when obligations are denominated in U.F.’s, their real value remains constant (i.e. they are 
held constant in terms of purchasing power). Id. at 5. For an analysis of the experience of the Chilean 
U.F., see Robert J. Shiller, Indexed Units of Account: Theory and Assessment of Historical Experience, 
in INDEXATION, INFLATION, AND MONETARY POLICY 105 (Fernando Lefort & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel 
eds., Central Bank of Chile 2002), http://www.bancocentraldechile.cl/estudios/banca-
central/pdf/v2/105_134Shiller%20.pdf.  
 94  This list is available at 
http://www.svs.cl/sitio/estadisticas/valores_emision_bonos_corporativos.php. Issuances by financial 
companies or companies controlled by the state are excluded.  
 95  Some studies, such as Bardozzetti & Dottori and Becker et al. use secondary market data (i.e., the 
price of the bond in the secondary market) to estimate the yield and spread of the bond. See Bardozzetti 
& Dottori, supra note 57, at 288; Becker et al., supra note 39, at 135; see also supra note 54 and 
accompanying text. Other studies, such as Eichengreen & Moody and Bradley & Gulati use primary 
market data, calculating the yield based on the initial pricing of the bond when originally issued. See 
Eichengreen & Moody, supra note 39, at 254; Bradley & Gulati, supra note 56, at 2053. This Article 
follows the latter approach. In theory, secondary market data can provide an unbiased estimate of the 
intrinsic value of bonds with differing issue dates on the same date, facilitating the comparison across 
bonds. See Bardozzetti & Dottori, supra note 57, at 288; see also Bradley & Gulati, supra note 56, at 
2053. However, if markets are illiquid or not otherwise efficient, then secondary market data is less 
reliable, a point raised by Bradley and Gulati in the context of sovereign bonds. See Bradley & Gulati, 
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bonds, and the aggregate principal amount. I complement this information 
by reviewing the corresponding prospectuses for the bond issues in the 
sample and the periodic financial reports filed by the issuing companies 
with the SVS.96  
A review of the prospectuses and indentures reveals whether the bond 
is governed by a CAC, as well as any financial restrictions imposed on the 
issuer such as interest cover or leverage ratios.97 In addition, as part of its 
registration materials, the issuer must obtain a credit rating from two credit 
agencies. 98 Companies that have issued securities in the public markets 
must file quarterly and annual financial reports with the SVS, which include 
the issuer’s total assets and shareholders’ equity, as well as various 
measures of the issuers’ leverage, which are described later.99 Following 
Bradley & Gulati,100 I calculate the corresponding spread for each bond 
issue (the outcome variable of interest), by subtracting from the initial yield 
of the bond issue the initial yield on the debt of similar maturity issued by 
the Chilean Central Bank during the same calendar month.101  
 IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 A. Assessing the Value of CACs 
 1. CACs and Interest Rate Spreads 
Table 1 provides a set of summary statistics for those bonds issued 
between July 1, 2007 and December 31, 2013 (i.e., during the “post-reform 
period” of the sample), including the frequency of CACs and the average 
spread for these bonds classified according to whether or not the indenture 
 
supra note 56, at 2053–54. In addition, the when-issued rate (i.e., initial yield) is a more appropriate 
measure of an issuer’s actual cost of capital. Id. at 2053. 
 96  Issuers file quarterly and yearly financial information with the SVS. This information is publicly 
available at the SVS website, http://www.svs.cl/sitio/mercados/valores.php. 
 97  See discussion infra Part IV.A.3. 
 98  Issuers must obtain a credit rating from two registered credit rating agencies and disclose such 
rating in the prospectus, as well as in the registration documents. See Law No. 18405 arts. 76, 88, 
Octubre 22, 1981 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). 
 99  See infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 100 See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 56, at 2046. 
 101 Data on bonds issued by the Chilean Central is available at the historical statistics section of the 
Chilean Central Bank website, available at http://www.bcentral.cl/bde/index.htm. Since the Chilean 
Central Bank issues bonds in maturities of 5, 10, 20 and 30 years, not all of the bonds in the database 
can be perfectly matched to a similar government security. To address this problem, each bond in the 
sample is matched to the Chilean government bond with the closest maturity. Bonds with maturities 
between 25 and 30 years are matched with the government 30-year bond; bonds with maturities between 
15 and 25 years are matched with the 20-year bond; bonds with maturities between 7 and 15 years are 
matched with the government 10-year bond; and bonds with maturities less than 7 years are matched 
with the government 5-year bond.  
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governing a particular bond issue included a CAC.102 Two interesting 
patterns emerge from these summary statistics. First, although issuers and 
investors have a slight overall preference to include CACs in the indentures 
governing bond issues (approximately 54% of the indentures include such 
clauses), a sizable minority does not.103 Second, the average spread for bond 
issues which include CACs is about 20% lower than the spread for those 
issues that do not include such clauses.104 The difference in the average 
spread across the two groups of bonds, just over 30 basis points, is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 105 These two results suggest that the 
flexibility provided by the new regime is valuable to contracting parties.106  
  
 
 102 Even though parties incorporating a CAC are free to set the qualified majority required to 
authorize changes to the core terms at any level between 75% and 100%, all issues that include a CAC 
set 75% as the qualified majority. Thus, it is not necessary to distinguish among different levels of 
qualified majorities.  
 103 See infra Table 1, column (1).  
 104 The average spread for bonds issued with a CAC is 1.1362, while the average spread for bonds 
which do not contain a CAC is 1.4430. See infra Table 1, column (2). The median spread for issues that 
include a CAC is 24.8 basis points lower than those that do not include such clause (1.1264 for the 
former and 1.3841 for the latter), which provides some reassurance that the difference in means is not 
being driven by outliers or by multiple issuances by a few companies. 
 105 The p-value from a two-tailed test that the mean spread for the issues containing a CAC is equal 
to the mean spread of issues not containing a CAC is 0.002. See infra Table 1, column (2).  
 106 For instance, the average effect associated with the inclusion of CAC, a 30 basis points reduction, 
represents about 7.5% of the average effective interest rate in the sample, 4.10%. It should be noted that 
this interest rate is for the debt denominated in U.F.’s, which are inflation-indexed. If the amounts owed 
were expressed in Chilean Pesos, the average interest rate would be higher.  
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS – BY CAC ADOPTION 
(JUL. 2007 – DEC. 2013) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Contains 









Yes 76 1.1362 2,440,046 1.2533 7.6513 6.8947 
No 66 1.4430 2,566,737 1.4677 5.9097 6.803 
Difference  0.3067 126,690 0.2144 1.7416 0.0917 
p-value  0.0020 0.9079 0.1697 0.125 0.7269 
 
Notes: Column (1) presents the number of bonds issued with and without CACs.  The 
variable in column (2) is the spread of issue i, defined as the interest rate on bond i and the 
corresponding bond issued by the Chilean Central Bank with a similar maturity. Column (3) 
presents the assets of the issuer (in Chilean pesos) as recorded in the issuer’s balance sheet 
for the fiscal year preceding the offering. Column (4) presents the debt-equity ratio, defined 
as the ratio of total debt to total shareholders’ equity, as these appear in the end of year 
balance sheet for the fiscal year preceding the bond issue. The interest cover ratio, i.e., the 
ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to the issuer’s fixed charges (e.g., interest 
payments), for the fiscal year preceding the bond issue is presented in column (5).  Credit 
rating information is presented in column (6) (see supra note 109 for a description of this 
variable). The p-values in columns (2)–(6) come from a two-tailed test that the mean of the 
corresponding variable for the bond issues containing a CAC are equal to the mean of the 
corresponding variable for the bond issues not containing a CAC. 
 
Comparing differences in average spreads to assess the value of CACs 
can be misleading since differences in interest rate spreads could be 
explained by various issuer characteristics that affect the rate of return 
demanded by investors (such as the size and leverage of the issuer), some of 
which may also be correlated with the adoption of a CAC. To account for 
such characteristics, Table 1 also provides summary statistics on the size 
(i.e., total assets), leverage (i.e., debt-equity ratio and interest cover ratio), 
and credit rating for those bond issues that include a CAC and those that do 
not.107 There is no significant difference in the size of issuers issuing bonds 
containing CACs and bonds not containing those clauses.108 Although 
issuers including a CAC have on average a better credit rating, the 
 
 107 Information about an issuer’s assets, debt-equity ratio and interest cover ratio is obtained from 
the financial information furnished periodically by companies with the SVS. See Superintendencia de 
Valores y Seguros, supra note 96. Credit rating information is obtained from the registration materials 
filed by companies with the SVS when issuing bonds. See Law No. 18405 arts. 76, 88, Octubre 22, 1981 
DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). 
 108 The difference in the total assets of the companies that issue bonds with and without CACs is 
small in magnitude (under 5%) and is not statistically significant. See infra Table 1, column (3).  
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difference is small and not statistically significant and, moreover, the 
median credit rating is the same across these two groups.109  
Issuers including a CAC in their bonds do appear to have lower levels 
of debt relative to their assets and income, a fact that could explain some of 
the observed difference in spreads across the two groups of bonds. Bonds 
containing a CAC are issued by companies having a lower debt to equity 
ratio (1.25) than those issuing bonds not containing CACs (1.47).110 This 
suggests that bonds containing CACs are issued by companies that have 
lower levels of leverage, i.e., that have higher levels of assets relative to 
their liabilities. The difference, however, is relatively small and not 
statistically significant.111 More notably, bonds containing a CAC are issued 
by companies having a higher interest cover ratio (7.65) than those issuing 
bonds not containing CACs (5.91).112 This suggests that bonds containing 
CACs are issued by companies that generate more earnings relative to the 
aggregate annual amount of interest they must pay under their outstanding 
debt obligations. Although the difference is not statistically significant, the 
relative magnitude is not necessarily trivial.113 However, it is worth noting 
that the differences in the median values of the interest cover ratios across 
the two groups are substantially lower (5.14 v. 4.83), which suggests that 
the difference in the averages may be driven by outliers or multiple 
issuances by a few companies.  
To examine the relationship between the adoption of CACs and the 
credit spread of a bond issue in a manner that controls for the potential 
differences in issuer characteristics highlighted above, one can estimate the 
following baseline specification: 
 
 
 109 See infra Table 1, column (6). Each bond issue is assigned to a group based on the maximum 
rating obtained in the documents presented as part of the offering materials. These credit rating bins are 
then assigned a number, with higher values indicating higher rating: AA+ (9), AA (8), AA- (7), A+ (6), 
A (5), A- (4), BB+ (3). The median credit rating for both groups is 7 (i.e., AA-).  
 110 See infra Table 1, column (4). The debt-equity ratio describes the relative proportions of the 
assets contributed by the debtholders and equityholders in a company and is commonly used to describe 
the leverage of a firm. It is calculated by dividing the issuer’s total liabilities by the shareholders’ equity 
(i.e., the company’s total assets minus total liabilities), as both measures appear in the company’s 
balance sheet. See WILLIAM J. CARNEY, CORPORATE FINANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 54 (2d ed. 
2010).  
 111 See infra Table 1, column (4).  
 112 See infra Table 1, column (5). The interest cover ratio measures the extent to which interest 
obligations and other fixed charges are covered by the issuer’s earnings. It is often calculated by 
dividing the company’s earnings before interest for a period and taxes by the total amount of interest 
payable during that period. See CARNEY, supra note 110, at 55.  
 113 See infra Table 1, column (5).  
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 where Spreadi, the outcome of interest, is the difference between the 
interest rate on bond i and the corresponding bond issued by the Chilean 
Central Bank with a similar maturity during the same month;114 CACi is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the agreement governing bond issue i 
included a CAC; LogAssetsi is the natural logarithm of the issuer’s total 
assets as these appear in the end of year balance sheet for the year preceding 
the offering; LogMaturityi is the natural logarithm of the maturity of the 
bond; LogPrincipali is the natural logarithm of the aggregate principal 
amount the bonds issued; Debt/Equityi is the ratio of total debt to 
shareholders’ equity total assets as these appear in the end of year balance 
sheet for the year preceding the offering;115 CoverRatioi is the ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxes to fixed charges for the issuer in the fiscal 
year preceding the offering;116 CreditRatingi is a set of fixed effects based 
on the highest of the two credit ratings assigned to issue i in the 
corresponding registration statement;117 Yeari is a set of year fixed 
effects;118 and εi is an error term.119 
 
 114 See Banco Central de Chile, supra note 101 and accompanying text.  
 115 Yearly financial data for each issuer is available at the SVS website. See Superintendencia de 
Valores y Seguros, supra note 96. 
 116 Id. 
 117 The issues are assigned to one of the following five groups depending on the highest credit rating 
assigned in the corresponding registration statement: AA+ (19 obs.), AA (40 obs.), AA- (24 obs.), A+ 
(27 obs.), and A and lower (25 obs.). 
 118 Including year fixed effects allow us to control for any trends in corporate bond spreads which 
are driven by macroeconomic factors but that may coincide with the inclusion of CACs in indentures. 
This is a concern since CACs could not be adopted by issuers prior to the reform and following the 
reform adoption of CACs was initially slower than in later years. See Berdejo, supra note 48, at 561–63 
(documenting an increasing trend in the adoption of CACs in the indentures of bonds issued in the years 
immediately following the reform in Chile). Thus, if average spreads in the Chilean corporate bond 
market significantly decrease throughout the sample, then the coefficient on the CACi indicator variable 
may be simply capturing this trend. This, however, does not appear to be the case. The average (median) 
spread in the pre-reform period is 0.982 (0.944) while the average (median) spread in the post-reform 
period is 1.279 (1.200). 
 119 Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the issuer level are used in all calculations 
of statistical significance throughout the Article. Although the dataset includes a total of 195 bonds, 
these are issued by sixty-five different companies. If one does not adjust for the fact that bonds issued by 
the same company are likely not to be independent observations the estimated standard errors will 
appear to be smaller than they actually are, leading the researcher to erroneously find results to be 
statistically significant. One method of dealing with this problem in panel data is to cluster the estimates 
of the standard errors by issuing company, which takes into account the covariance between the issues 
of a particular company through time when calculating the corresponding standard errors. See Mitchell 
A. Peterson, Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches, 22 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 435, 457–60 (2009).  
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The estimates for this baseline specification are presented in column 
(1) and column (2) of Table 3. Column (2) presents the results of the 
analysis including all 195 bonds in the sample, while the results in column 
(1) restrict the sample to the 142 bonds issued in the post-reform period in 
the sample. Let us first focus on the subset of bonds issued during the post-
reform period of the sample (since issuers could not have adopted CACs 
prior to the reform). As one can see, the coefficient on CACi is negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that the inclusion of a CAC in an 
indenture is associated with lower interest rates, even after controlling for 
the various issuer characteristics described earlier, including measures of a 
firm’s leverage and creditworthiness. The magnitude of this effect is 
substantial. The coefficient on the CACi indicator variable, 28.5 basis 
points, represents 25.4% of the average spread in the sample of bonds 
issued during the post-reform period (112 basis points). 120 The results are 
identical for the entire sample of bonds (i.e., if we include bonds issued in 
the pre-reform period).121  
  
 
 120 See infra Table 2, column (1).  
 121 For the whole sample, the coefficient on CACi indicator variable, 29.1 basis points, represents 
24.3% of the average spread in sample (119.8 basis points). See infra Table 2, column (2).  
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TABLE 2. ADOPTION OF CACS & SPREADS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 By Issue By Issuer-Year 
 Post Reform 
Issues 
All Issues Post Reform 
Issues 
All Issues 
     
CAC -0.285** -0.291** -0.262** -0.283** 
 [0.115] [0.113] [0.128] [0.124] 
     
LogMaturity 0.0148 0.0201   
 [0.0497] [0.0436]   
     
LogAssets 0.0972 0.0935** 0.112* 0.119** 
 [0.0584] [0.0451] [0.0606] [0.0476] 
     
LogAmount -0.0609 -0.0591 -0.0906 -0.0725 
 [0.107] [0.0807] [0.0806] [0.0715] 
     
Debt/Equity -0.0307 -0.00876 -0.0132 0.0163 
 [0.0799] [0.0704] [0.1000] [0.0888] 
     
CoverRatio 0.0088 0.004 0.0097 0.0054 
 [0.0057] [0.0060] [0.0065] [0.0066] 
     
Mean 
Outcome  
1.1221 1.198 1.3068 1.2067 
Observations 142 195 90 126 
R-squared 0.438 0.419 0.446 0.451 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the issuer level in brackets (* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). The outcome in columns (1) – (2) is the spread 
of issue i, defined as the interest rate on bond i and the corresponding bond issued by the 
Chilean Central Bank.  In columns (3) and (4) the data is collapsed at the issuer-year level 
and the outcome variable is the average spread for each issuer during a given calendar year 
weighted by offering size (see supra note 123 for more details).  Columns (1) and (3) include 
bonds issued between July 1 2007 and December 31, 2013.  Columns (2) and (4) include 
bonds issued between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2013.  The explanatory variables 
of interest are: (i) CAC, an indicator variable equal to 1 if a the bond agreement governing 
issue i included a collective action clause; (ii) LogAssets, the natural logarithm of the issuer’s 
total assets for the fiscal year preceding the bond issue, (iii) LogAmount, the natural 
logarithm of the aggregate principal amount the bonds issued of issue i; (iv) LogMaturity, 
the log of the term of bond i; (v) Debt/Equity, the ratio of total debt to total shareholder 
equity as these appear in the end of year balance sheet for the fiscal year preceding the bond 
issue; and (vi) Cover Ratio, the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to fixed charges 
for the fiscal year preceding the bond issue.  All regressions include a set of year fixed 
effects and a set of credit rating fixed effects (see supra note 117 for more details). 
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One concern is that these results may be driven by multiple bond 
issuances by a few companies.122 To rule out this possibility one can 
aggregate the data at the firm-year level by calculating the weighted 
average spread during each calendar year for each company by weighing 
each bond issue according to its offering size relative to the company’s 
other bond offerings in the same calendar year.123 For a firm f that had n 
different bond issues in a given year y, the weighted average spread for that 
firm-year can be calculated using the following formula: 
 
 
 where Principalfyj is the aggregate principal amount issued in bond 
offering j and Spreadfyj is the spread corresponding to bond issue j. 124  
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 present the results of specifications 
analogous to those presented in columns (1) and (2) using this weighted 
average spread as the outcome variable of interest. The estimates for the 
coefficient on CACi are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those 
discussed earlier. In the post-reform portion of the sample, the magnitude of 
the CACi coefficient, 26.2 basis points, represents approximately 20.1% of 
the mean weighted average spread (1.3068).125 This evidence confirms that 
the baseline results are not necessarily being driven by multiple bond 
issuances conducted by a few firms. 
The results presented thus far, however, must be interpreted with care, 
as they do not necessarily establish a causal connection between the 
adoption of a CAC and the spread the market demands from an issuer. The 
obvious problem is that issuers and investors choose whether or not to 
include a CAC in their indenture agreement, raising potential endogeneity 
 
 122 The 195 bonds contained in the dataset are issued by sixty-five different companies. 
 123 The data can be collapsed in this manner since for every company in the dataset, the values of the 
contractual variables considered in these analyses (such as the presence of a CAC or the credit rating of 
the issuer) are identical across multiple issuances by the same company in a given calendar year. 
Multiple issuances in the same calendar year arise in situations where the issuer simultaneously issues 
bonds with different maturities (e.g., one bond with a maturity of ten years and another with a maturity 
of twenty-five years), each bond issue being governed in some cases by its own separate indenture.  
 124 For example, assume that Company A has two offerings in 2010. In the first offering, Company 
A issued $100 million dollars in aggregate par value of bonds with a spread of 1.5. In the second 
offering Company A issued $50 million dollars in aggregate par value of bonds with a spread of 1.2. The 
weighted average spread for Company A in year 2010 would be (100M/150M)*1.5 + (50M/150M)*1.2 
= 1.0 + 0.4 = 1.4. 
 125 See infra Table 2, column (3). The magnitude of the CACi coefficient, 28.3 basis points, 
represents approximately 23.4% of the mean weighted average spread in the sample that includes the 
pre-reform bonds (1.2067). See infra Table 2, column (4).  
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concerns.126 The analysis that follow will try to correct for any bias 
introduced by these unobserved variables, thus allowing us to establish a 
cleaner link between the adoption of CACs and bond spreads.127  
 2. Correcting for Endogeneity 
As just noted, the interpretation of the results presented in Table 2 can 
be complicated by the possibility that unobservable characteristics of an 
issuer (i.e., variables which are omitted from the analyses presented earlier) 
that may be positively correlated with the likelihood of CAC adoption and 
negatively correlated with the interest rate spread demanded by investors 
are driving the results. 128 The fact that the specifications estimated above 
do control for a number of issue and issuer characteristics, such as credit 
quality, leverage, size of the offering, term and year of issue, suggests that 
such omitted variables are likely not driving the results. To provide further 
reassurance, the analyses in this section try to explicitly control for such 
unobserved firm characteristics. 
One method frequently used to control for the self-selection problem 
described above is to include firm fixed effects in the specification, which 
will capture any time-invariant unobservable characteristics of the issuer.129 
This firm-fixed effect model can be specified as follows: 
 
 
 126 This particular problem is common in empirical studies in the field of corporate finance. See Kai 
Li & Nagpurnanandr R. Prabhala, Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance, in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE – EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 37, 40 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007) 
(“Corporate finance concerns the financing and investment choices made by firms and a broad swathe of 
decisions within these broad choices. These choices are not usually random, but are deliberate decisions 
by firms or their managers to self-select into their preferred choices.”). 
 127 The importance of this endogeneity concern for the interpretation of the results ultimately 
depends on the question being addressed. The sole goal of these analyses is not necessarily to establish 
that randomly assigning CACs across bonds would result in investors demanding a lower spread relative 
to those without a CAC (or that forcing market participants to include a CAC would lead to lower 
spreads in every transaction). The objective is rather to determine whether affording parties the freedom 
to make this contractual choice (as did the Chilean reform) can enhance the value of transactions among 
issuers and investors in the public debt markets. One would expect issuers and investors to include a 
CAC if they believe that doing so increases the overall value of a particular transaction (e.g., if the 
decrease in the expected costs of financial distress outweigh any moral hazard concerns). See, e.g., 
Eichengreen & Mody, supra note 39, at 263. Depending on the relative bargaining power of the parties, 
a fraction of this increase in value would then be passed on to the issuer by means of a lower spread. 
Thus, observing that (1) some issues include a CAC and (2) that these issues have a lower spread, at the 
very least suggests that the contractual choice likely creates value for the parties.  
 128 See Li & Prabhala, supra note 126. 
 129 See id. at 56. It should be noted that fixed effects address the endogeneity problem if the 
unobservable characteristics are time invariant; if these characteristics are time variant, then the 
inclusion of fixed-effects would not fully correct the endogeneity problem described earlier.  
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 where CACi, LogMaturityi and LogPrincipali are the same variables 
described in specification (1); Issuerji is a set of issuer fixed effects;130 and 
εi is an error term.131 Since the specification includes firm fixed effects, 
variables pertaining to firm characteristics are excluded as these are serially 
correlated across observations involving the same firm. The outcome of 
interest in specification (2) is AdjSpreadi, which is equal to the spread on 
bond i, as defined earlier,132 minus the average spread for all bonds in the 
sample that were issued in the same calendar year as bond i. The outcome 
variable AdjSpreadi is constructed in a manner that allows us to control for 
year to year changes in the average spread demanded by the market from 
corporate issuers without having to include year fixed effects, the inclusion 
of which would not be advisable given the number of bonds issued by each 
company in each calendar year.   
 In specification (2) the coefficient CACi measures the effect of 
including a CAC by relying on within-firm variation in the adoption of 
CACs – i.e., for a given firm, it tells us what is the effect of including a 
CAC on the spread demanded by the firm’s investors, holding everything 
else constant (including observable and unobservable firm characteristics). 
Column (1) of Table 3 presents the estimates for all bonds issued by firms 
that have two or more bonds in the sample.133 The estimate for the 
coefficient on CACi, 21.7 basis points, is quite similar in magnitude to the 
baseline estimates presented earlier.134  
Since firms could not issue bonds with CACs prior to July 2007 and 
 
 130 This set of firm fixed effects consists of a series of dummy variables, each of which is equal to 
one for one of the firms in the sample and zero for the other firms. For example, consider Firm A and 
Firm B. The variable IssuerAi would be the fixed-effect corresponding to Firm A. In the dataset, the 
variable IssuerAi would be coded as one for Firm A and as zero for Firm B. Similarly, the variable 
IssuerBi would be coded as zero for Firm A and as one for Firm B. The number of firm fixed effects is 
equal to the number of different firms in the sample minus one (i.e., if there are fifty-one firms in the 
sample, there would be fifty dummy variables). 
 131 As in the other specification estimated in this Article, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered at the issuer level are used in the calculation of statistical significance. See supra note 119. 
 132 See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
 133 There are a total of fifty-one firms with more than one bond in the sample. Bonds issued by firms 
that only have one bond in the sample are excluded given the presence of firm fixed effects in the model.  
 134 See infra Table 3, column (1). The fact that the size of the coefficient is smaller suggests that 
some of the differences in spreads across bonds with and without CACs documented in Table 2 were 
related to unobservable firm characteristics. It is also worth noting that the results in the model with firm 
fixed effects have lower statistical significance. This is due to the limited power that models with fixed 
effects have given the fact that they solely rely on intra-firm variation. See Li & Prabhala, supra note 
126, at 56.  
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the adoption of CACs following the reform increased with the passage of 
time,135 one could worry that the coefficient on CACi is merely capturing a 
trend in corporate bond spreads across the pre- and post-reform periods. To 
address this concern, we can examine changes in the spreads and estimate 
the following specification: 
 
 
 Specification (3) is identical to specification (2), but the variable CACi 
is replaced by the variable PostReformi, an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
bond i was issued after July 1, 2007. If the estimate of the coefficient on 
CACi presented in column (1) of Table 3 merely reflected an exogenous 
time trend in corporate spreads one would expect the coefficient on 
PostReformi to be negative and statistically significant. However, this is not 
the case. The magnitude of the coefficient on PostReformi is substantially 
smaller than the magnitude of the coefficient on CACi, which was estimated 
in specification (2) (0.39 basis points compared to 21.66 basis points), is 
close to zero and is not statistically significant. 136 This confirms that the 
results presented in column (1) of Table 3 do not merely reflect an 
underlying trend unrelated to the adoption of CACs.  
  
 
 135 See Berdejo, supra note 48, at 561–63 (documenting an increasing trend in the adoption of CACs 
in the indentures of bonds issued in the years immediately following the reform in Chile). 
 136 See infra Table 3, column (2).  
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TABLE 3. ISSUER FIXED EFFECTS SPECIFICATIONS 
(JAN. 2005 – DEC. 2013) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All issuers with multiple 
bonds 
Adopters 
    
CAC -0.2166*  -0.2159* 
 [0.114]  [0.114] 
    
PostReform  -0.039  
  [0.154]  
    
LogMaturity 0.0477 0.0455 0.0104 
 [0.0421] [0.0449] [0.0446] 
    
LogAmount 0.0342 0.0369 -0.0158 
 [0.104] [0.105] [0.178] 
    
No. of Issuers  51 51 12 
Observations 181 181 65 
R-squared 0.599 0.584 0.477 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the issuer level in brackets (* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). The outcome in columns (1) - (3) is the adjusted 
spread of issue i, defined as the interest rate on bond i and the corresponding bond issued by 
the Chilean Central Bank with a similar maturity, minus the average spread for all bonds 
issued in the same calendar year as bond i.  The explanatory variable of interest in columns 
(1) and (3) is CAC, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the governing contractual instrument 
for bond i contained a collective action clause.  In column (2), the explanatory variable of 
interest is PostReform, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the issuance of bond i occurred 
after July 1, 2007.  In addition, columns (1) – (3) include the following explanatory 
variables: (i) LogAmount, the natural logarithm of the aggregate principal amount the bonds 
issued of issue i and (ii) LogMaturity, the log of the term of bond i.  Columns (1) and (2) 
include all bonds issued by companies that issued at least two bonds in the sample.  Column 
(3) includes only those bonds issued by companies that issued bonds with and without 
CACs.  All regressions include a set of issuer fixed effects. 
 
Another potential concern with the results presented in column (1) of 
Table 3 is that it includes bonds issued by firms that never adopted a CAC 
in their indentures during the time period covered in the dataset. Given that 
the model presented in specification (2) includes fixed effects, including 
bonds issued by these firms, contributes very little to the identification of 
the effect of the inclusion of a CAC on spreads.137 To address this concern 
 
 137 See Gugiatti & Richards, supra note 55, at 440–41. The inclusion of bonds issued by these firms 
does, however, help calibrate the value for the coefficients on the covariates included in the model (i.e., 
the aggregate principal amount and maturity of each bond issue).  
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one can estimate specification (2) relying only on those bonds issued by 
firms that do adopt CACs at some point in the post-reform period of the 
sample. The resulting coefficient on CACi based on this subset of bonds, 
21.6 basis points, is identical to that found in the analysis of the broader 
sample and is also similar in magnitude to the coefficient on CACi 
presented in the baseline results in Table 2.138  
 3. CACs and Restrictive Covenants 
The results presented thus far indicate that including a CAC in the 
indenture governing a bond issue results in lower spreads for the issuer. 
However, the mechanism for amending the core terms of a bond is just one 
of the many provisions contained in the governing indenture that may affect 
the pricing of the underlying bonds.139 To protect themselves, creditors also 
include a variety of covenants that curtail the ability of the issuer from 
taking certain actions that could jeopardize its liquidity or otherwise 
adversely impact bondholders’ interests (e.g., payment of excessive 
dividends, claim dilution, and excessive risk-taking, among others).140 A 
breach of one of these covenants by the issuer may give creditors the right 
to declare a default and accelerate all amounts owed by the borrower (i.e., 
demand the immediate repayment of the principal and matured interest).141 
One type of such protective covenant are financial covenants, which 
establish certain ratios (typically based on information derived from a 
firm’s financial statement) that the issuer must meet periodically (i.e., on a 
yearly or quarterly basis). Typically, failure to comply with these ratios then 
triggers an event of default under the terms of the indenture.142  
 
 138 See infra Table 3, column (3).  
 139 In addition to establishing the principal amount, interest, maturity and other payment terms of the 
issued bonds, an indenture contains various covenants the issuer must adhere to. Investors in debt 
instruments rely on such contractual covenants since for the most part, corporate law provides limited 
protection to bondholders, who must worry not only about mismanagement and self-dealing by directors 
and officers, but also about shareholder expropriation of creditor wealth (e.g., payment of excessive 
dividends, claim dilution, and excessive risk-taking, among others). See Clifford W. Smith & Jerold B. 
Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118–19 
(1979).  
 140 In negotiating the strictness of these covenants issuers and investors face a tradeoff – restricting 
managerial discretion may limit the opportunistic behavior, but it may also constrain managers from 
taking actions that maximize firm value (and reduce the probability of default). See Smith & Warner, 
supra note 139, at 118–19. In addition, the breach of a covenant may not be associated with the early 
stages of financial distress, leading to unnecessary renegotiations. See Ilia D. Dichev & Douglas J. 
Skinner, Large-Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 1091, 1093 (2002) 
(finding that covenant breaches by debt issuers are common and not necessarily indicative of the 
financial distress).  
 141 See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Market Conditions and Contract Design: Variations in Debt 
Contracting, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 51, 57 (2013).  
 142 The other general type of covenant is a restrictive covenant pursuant to which the issuer promises 
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Restrictive and financial covenants are more likely to be included (and 
be tighter, if included) in situations where investors are concerned about 
issuer moral hazard (i.e., the issuer’s incentive or propensity to engage in 
inefficient risk-taking).143 Thus, if investors worry that the moral hazard 
problem associated with CACs may lead the issuer to undertake riskier 
actions that increase the likelihood of financial distress,144 one could expect 
financial covenants to be tighter in bonds containing CACs, thus mitigating 
the costs associated with such clauses.145 Such systematic differences 
between instruments with and without CACs in the structure and content of 
these restrictive and financial covenants would add a nuance to the 
interpretation of the results presented above. First, tighter financial 
covenants, which by restricting the issuer’s ability to take certain actions 
reduce the probability of financial distress and non-payment, could explain 
in part the lower spread observed in the sample for bond issues containing a 
CAC.146 Second, from the issuer’s perspective, the value (or at least 
attractiveness) of a CAC is somewhat reduced by the presence of such 
tighter covenants, which restrict its abilities to take certain actions and 
subject it to continuous monitoring and review by the bondholders. 
To verify whether the inclusion of CAC coincides with tighter 
financial covenants, I reviewed the relevant sections in the indentures 
governing the bonds in the sample to identify the inclusion and structure of 
financial covenants. The most common financial covenant is the leverage 
ratio, which is present in 114 of the 142 indentures in the post-reform 
sample. This type of covenant generally provides that the ratio of total debt 
of the company to the company’s total assets (both balance sheet 
accounting measures) cannot be higher than a given amount for the 
 
to refrain from taking certain actions (i.e., sell assets or declare a dividend) unless a prescribed set of 
conditions is met. Id.  
 143 Id. at 58–59. In general, financially sound issuers generally face fewer restrictions than their 
more risky counterparts. See, e.g., Sattar A. Mansi, Yaxuan Qi & John K. Wald, Debt Covenants, 
Bankruptcy Risk and Issuance Costs, 19–22 (Apr. 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1805038; see also Michael Bradley & Michael 
Roberts, The Structure and Pricing of Corporate Debt Covenants, 16–21 (May 2004), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=466240. 
 144 See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
 145 In other words, there may be an efficient trade-off across contractual provisions: investors may 
be acquiescing to the inclusion of CACs (which are valuable to issuers), but asking that in return the 
issuer agrees to tighter covenants (which are valuable to investors). The tightness of financial covenants 
could also be correlated with the inclusion of a CAC if issuers of bonds containing CACs have qualities 
that make the issuer otherwise less risky from the bondholders’ perspective. Thus, if investors agree to 
the inclusion of CACs in situations where the issuers are of a “higher quality” (particularly in some 
dimension that one cannot observe or measure), then one would expect to see less restrictive covenants 
and lower spreads in bond issues containing CACs.  
 146 However, it is hard to imagine that the tighter financial covenants would outweigh the perceived 
additional risk brought by the inclusion of the CAC in a way that results in the observed lower average 
spreads. 
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previous four fiscal quarters. The second most common financial covenant 
is the interest coverage ratio, contained in 42 of the indentures in the post-
reform sample, which generally provides that the ratio of the earnings of the 
company to the company’s total interest payment obligations must be 
higher than a given amount for the previous four fiscal quarters. A higher 
maximum leverage ratio and a lower minimum interest coverage ratio 
provide the issuer with more financial slack. Conversely, a lower maximum 
leverage ratio and a higher minimum interest coverage ratio place tighter 
restrictions on the issuer. 
 
TABLE 4.  FINANCIAL COVENANTS & CAC ADOPTION 
(JUL. 2007 – DEC. 2013) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Leverage Ratio Cover Ratio 
CAC Mean Median Mean Median 
Yes  1.5 1.5 2.712 2.815 
No  1.35 1.4 2.5 2.5 
Difference -0.15  -0.212  
p-value 0.158  0.092  
 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) present summary statistics on financial covenants prescribing a 
maximum leverage ratio, which is present in 114 of the 142 indentures in the post-reform 
sample. This type of covenant typically provides that the ratio of total debt of the company 
to the company’s total assets cannot be higher than a given amount for the previous four 
fiscal quarters. Columns (3) and (4) present summary statistics for financial covenants 
prescribing a minimum interest covera ratio, contained in 42 of the indentures in the post-
reform sample, which typically provides that ratio of the earnings of the company to the 
company’s total interest payment obligations must be higher than a given amount for the 
previous four fiscal quarters. P-values come from a two-tailed test that the mean threshold 
financial ratio for the issues containing a CAC are equal to the mean threshold financial ratio 
of issues not containing a CAC. 
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Table 4 provides summary statistics for the thresholds associated with 
these financial covenants.147 The average prescribed leverage ratio is 
slightly lower for bond issues not containing a CAC (1.350) than for those 
containing CACs (1.500), which suggests that agreements containing a 
CAC actually provide the issuer with more financial slack.148 However, this 
difference is not statistically significant and is smaller if one looks at the 
median values of the ratios instead.149 On the other hand, the average 
prescribed interest cover ratio is higher for issues containing a CAC (2.712) 
than for those not containing such clauses (2.500). 150 Although small, the 
difference is statistically significant at the 10% level.151 This suggests that 
firms issuing bonds with CAC face a tighter interest cover ratio covenant; 
however given the low number of observations (and inherent self-selection 
issues involved), it is difficult to draw any strong inferences.  
These small, inconsistent and statistically insignificant differences 
between the financial covenants of the bond issues that contain CACs and 
those bond issues that do not provide some reassurance that the inclusion of 
CACs is not otherwise being accompanied by tighter restrictive covenants 
on the issuers. This, in turn, allows us to establish a clearer link between the 
adoption of CACs and the resulting lower spreads documented earlier in 
this article. 
 B. CACs & Issuer Credit Rating 
The results presented thus far indicate that corporate bonds that 
contain a CAC command lower spreads than bonds not containing such 
clauses, thus lowering the cost of capital for those firms able to issue bonds 
incorporating CACs. This link between CACs and yield spreads was 
documented for the entire sample of bonds, which includes bonds of 
varying credit quality.152 Notably, several of the existing studies in this area 
have not found such a relationship to exist across the entire spectrum of 
bonds, finding that while CACs lower the spread for some issuers, they 
 
 147 The data is presented at the bond issue level. The results are qualitatively similar if the data is 
aggregated at the issuer-year level – the differences across groups is actually slightly smaller. The data 
can be collapsed in this manner since for every company in the dataset, the values of the contractual 
variables considered in these analyses (i.e., the presence of a CAC and the financial covenants) are 
identical across multiple issuances by the same company in a given calendar year. See supra note 123 
and accompanying text. 
 148 See infra Table 4, column (1). 
 149 The median prescribed leverage ratios for indentures that contain a CAC is 1.50, while the 
median for those that do not contain a CAC is 1.40. See infra Table 4, column (2).  
 150 See infra Table 4, column (3).  
 151 The difference in the median prescribed interest cover ratios between indentures that contain a 
CAC (2.815) and those that do not (2.500) is slightly larger. See infra Table 4, column (4).  
 152 See supra Part IV.A.1.  
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increase it for others.153 Whether higher or lower credit quality issuers can 
benefit the most (or even at all) from the adoption of a CAC is therefore an 
open question in the literature.154  
Theoretically, it is not clear whether low or high credit quality issuers 
should benefit the most from adopting CACs in their bond agreements (at 
least in a way that affects the interest rate spread). As noted earlier, in 
deciding whether or not to include a CAC, contracting parties will balance 
the benefits (e.g., quicker and less costly reorganizations) against the costs 
(e.g., issuer moral hazard).155 To the extent that less creditworthy issuers are 
more likely to run into financial difficulties in the future, one would expect 
them to benefit more from the flexibility that CACs would afford in the 
event that they need to restructure their debt. On the other hand, riskier 
issuers may be more likely to engage in activities that increase the prospects 
of becoming financially distressed, especially if they are already 
overleveraged.156 Arguably, in this sense, higher credit quality issuers pose 
less risk, but can still benefit from the flexibility provided by CACs.  
In the next set of analyses, the bond issues in the sample are divided 
into two groups based on the highest credit rating furnished as part of the 
registration statement filed with the SVS.157 One group contains the bond 
issues for which the highest credit rating was AA or higher; the other group 
includes the bond issues for which the highest credit rating was AA- or 
lower.158 This particular cut-off was chosen because it is the one that 
divides the sample most evenly into two groups. In the entire sample, 104 
 
 153 Eichengreen and Mody’s estimates indicate that the inclusion of CACs increase the spread for 
lower rated sovereign issuers, but decreases them for higher rated issuers. Eichengreen & Mody, supra 
note 39, at 256–59. Becker et al. find a similar relationship in one of the time periods they study, but in 
another time period find the opposite relationship (i.e., CACs increase the spread for higher rated 
sovereign issuers, but decreases them for lower rated issuers). Becker et al., supra note 39, at 139–43. 
Bardozzetti and Dottori find that CACs decrease yield spreads for issuers in the middle of the credit 
rating distribution, but not for those at the top or the bottom. Bardozzetti & Dottori, supra note 57, at 
287–89. Bradely and Gulati also document differing effects of CACs on the spreads of low and high 
rated issuers. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 56, at 2079–86. Another study that finds similar effects of 
CACs for low and high rated issuers found no effect at all for either. Gugiatti & Richards, supra note 55, 
at 436–43. 
 154 And, as noted earlier, these studies have focused on sovereign bonds, devoting minimal—if 
any—attention to corporate bonds. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.  
 155 See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 156 The creditor-shareholder conflict becomes more pronounced when issuers are highly levered, as 
shareholders have greater incentives to undertake certain risky and value destroying activities. See Smith 
& Warner, On Financial Contracting, supra note 139, at 153–54. 
 157 Firms issuing bonds must obtain two credit ratings, which are submitted as part of the registration 
materials filed with the SVS. See Law No. 18405 arts. 76, 88, Octubre 22, 1981 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 
(Chile); supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 158 Although higher rated issuers are more likely to adopt a CAC (55.7%) than their lower credit 
quality counterparts (51.9%), the difference is small and not statistically significant (the p-value from a 
two-tailed test that the average CAC adoption rate for high rated issuers is equal to the adoption rate of 
low rated issuers is 0.6486). 
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of the bonds have a credit rating of AA- or lower while 91 have a credit 
rating of AA or AA+; while in the post-reform period of the sample, 81 of 
the bond issues belong to the low credit rating group, while 61 belong to the 
high credit rating group. 159  
One can then estimate the baseline specification (1) separately on each 
subset of issuers (though excluding credit rating fixed effects).160 The 
results for these specifications, which are presented in Table 5, strongly 
suggest that both high and low rated issuers benefit in a similar manner 
from the inclusion of a CAC in the indentures governing their bonds. Let us 
focus on the subset of bonds issued in the post-reform period. For issuers in 
the high credit rating group, the coefficient on CACi, -0.245, represents 
about 23% of the average spread in that subset of the sample and is 
statistically significant.161 Similarly, for lower rated issuers, the coefficient 
on CACi, -0.372, represents about 26% of the average spread in that subset 
of the sample.162 The results are qualitatively similar if we include the 
bonds issued in during the pre-reform period portion of the sample.163 
  
 
 159 Determining which credit rating to use and establishing a cut-off (or cut-offs) to divide the 
sample into two (or more) groups is to some extent arbitrary. In fact, many of the existing articles 
examining the effects of CACs on the yield spreads of sovereign bonds have used different cut-offs. See 
Häseler, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bonds, supra note 51, at 901.  
 160 This is the method followed by Bradely and Gulati in measuring the differing effects of CACs on 
the spreads of low and high rated sovereign issuers. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 56, at 2079–86. One 
could also estimate a single specification which includes an interaction term between the CAC indicator 
variable and the credit quality indicator variable. However, estimating a single specification with an 
interaction term may not be the most suitable method to measure the different effects that adopting a 
CAC has on the interest rate spreads demanded by investors from issuers of high and low credit quality. 
Such a joint model would be appropriate if we expected only the inclusion of a CAC in the indenture to 
interact with the creditworthiness of the issuer in determining the interest rate spread. However, some of 
the other covariates in the model (such as the issuer’s leverage) may also interact with the 
creditworthiness of the issuer in determining the resulting spread demanded by the market. A single 
specification would force the coefficient on all these other covariates to be the same for low and high 
credit quality issuers.  
 161 See infra Table 5, column (1). 
 162 See infra Table 5, column (2). 
 163 For issuers in the high credit rating group, the coefficient on CACi, -0.302, represents about 
29.8% of the average spread in that subset of the sample and is statistically significant. Similarly, for 
lower rated issuers, the coefficient on CACi, -0.376, represents about 27.6% of the average spread in that 
subset of the sample. See infra Table 5, columns (3) and (4). 
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TABLE 5. ADOPTION OF CACS, CREDIT QUALITY, AND SPREADS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 









     
CAC -0.245** -0.372* -0.302*** -0.376* 
 
[0.106] [0.217] [0.110] [0.214] 
     LogMaturity 0.0181 -0.0267 0.0326 -0.0386 
 
[0.0600] [0.0689] [0.0539] [0.0626] 
     LogAssets 0.0892 -0.0088 0.106* 0.0137 
 
[0.0777] [0.0975] [0.0597] [0.0809] 
     LogAmount -0.0447 -0.113 -0.0844 -0.0415 
 
[0.106] [0.159] [0.0882] [0.118] 
     Debt/Equity 0.2630* -0.0254 0.2130** -0.0323 
 
[0.134] [0.104] [0.101] [0.103] 
     CoverRatio 0.0054 0.0000 0.0009 -0.0024 
 
[0.0062] [0.0105] [0.0074] [0.0101] 
     Mean 
Outcome  1.0842 1.4254 1.0120 1.3608 
Observations 61 81 91 104 
R-squared 0.498 0.273 0.417 0.278 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the issuer level in brackets (* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). The outcome in columns (1) - (4) is the spread 
of issue i, defined as the interest rate on bond i and the corresponding bond issued by the 
Chilean Central Bank with a similar maturity.  Columns (1) and (2) include bonds issued 
between July 1, 2007 and December 31, 2013.  Columns (3) and (4) include bonds issued 
between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2013.  Columns (1) and (3) restrict the analyses 
to issues that obtained a credit rating equal or higher than AA-.  Columns (2) and (4) restrict 
the analyses to issues that did not obtain a credit rating equal or higher than AA-.  The 
explanatory variables of interest are: (i) CAC, an indicator variable equal to 1 if a the bond 
agreement governing issue i included a collective action clause; (ii) LogAssets, the natural 
logarithm of the issuer’s total assets for the fiscal year preceding the bond issue, (iii) 
LogAmount, the natural logarithm of the aggregate principal amount the bonds issued of 
issue i; (iv) LogMaturity, the log of the term of bond i; (v) Debt/Equity, the ratio of total debt 
to total shareholder equity as these appear in the end of year balance sheet for the fiscal year 
preceding the bond issue; and (vi) Cover Ratio, the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes 
to fixed charges for the fiscal year preceding the bond issue.  All regressions include a set of 
year fixed effects. 
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The evidence thus indicates that all issuers, regardless of their credit 
rating, can benefit from the inclusion of CACs, namely lower interest rates. 
This result contrasts with the results documented in earlier studies in which 
CACs are found to generally benefit only a subset of issuers.164  
 V. CONCLUSION 
The enabling structure of corporate law generally allows parties to 
contract freely in order to promote their best interests, leading to socially 
optimal arrangements.165 This precept should be particularly true in the 
context of corporate bonds, which are governed by complex, negotiated 
indentures and are purchased and held by large, sophisticated investors.166 
Despite these market realities, the regulation of the terms and conditions of 
public corporate debt in a number of countries has traditionally contained 
numerous mandatory rules, including prohibitions on the inclusion of 
CACs. Some countries, such as Chile and Germany, have recently repealed 
pre-existing legal restrictions on the use of CACs.167 However, the laws in 
other countries, most notably the United States, continue to prohibit the use 
of CACs.168 The evidence presented in this Article strongly suggests that a 
 
 164 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 165 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate On Contractual Freedom In Corporate Law, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) (“No one set of terms will be best for all; hence the ‘enabling’ 
structure of corporate law.”); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History in Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 444–49 (2001); Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the 
Corporate Field: A Critique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1544 (1989); Roberta Romano, 
Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1599, 1615–16 (1989); Edward P. Welch & Robert S. Saunders, What We Can Learn From Other 
Statutory Schemes: Freedom And Its Limits In The Delaware General Corporate Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 845, 860 (2008). 
 166 See Roe, supra note 33, at 277–79 (asserting that the protection of individual investors through 
the voting prohibition needs to be reconsidered in light of the current situation where institutional 
investors hold most public debts); Schwartz, supra note 33 at 631–32; Kahan, supra note 36, at 1060–
62. The concentrated and sophisticated nature of modern institutional intermediaries, particularly in the 
public credit markets, also makes it unlikely that bondholders will be taken advantage of, as was feared 
at the time when the TIA was drafted and enacted. See Roe, supra note 33, at 277–79 (asserting that the 
protection of individual investors through the voting prohibition needs to be reconsidered in light of the 
current situation where institutional investors hold most public debts). Historically, Section 316(b) of the 
TIA was adopted as a response to the financial crises of the 1930s resulting from the Great Depression 
and was aimed at preventing out-of-court debt restructurings from being forced upon minority 
bondholders by corporate insiders (such as large shareholders or banks) seeking to further their own 
interest at the expense of the (possibly uninformed) minority bondholders. See Eichengreen & Mody, 
supra note 39, at 250 n.2; Schwartz, supra note 33, at 631–32; and George W. Shuster, The Trust 
Indenture Act and International Debt Restructurings, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 431, 437 (2006).  
 167 See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text (discussing the German reform), supra notes 80–
83 and accompanying text (discussing the Chilean reform). 
 168 See supra notes 41–48 and accompanying text. 
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mandatory prohibition of CACs is misguided public policy and, more 
generally, informs the general debate surrounding the use of CACs in 
sovereign and corporate debt where allowed by applicable law. 
The recent legal reform in Chile, which repealed a preexisting ban on 
CACs, has yielded measurable economic effects as contracting parties have 
embraced the flexibility of the new regime. Bonds issued with a CAC after 
the reform have spreads that are, on average, 20% lower than those bond 
issues that do not include such clauses.169 The existence of this negative 
correlation between the inclusion of a CAC and the interest rate spread of a 
bond suggests that issuers and investors are adopting CACs in transactions 
where their inclusion results in optimal, more efficient arrangements that 
create economic value. The average effect, 28.5 basis points, translates to 
annual interest savings of over U.S. $415,000 for the average offering 
which add up to approximately U.S. $6.0 million during the life of the 
average bond in the sample.170  
Generally, these findings inform a number of ongoing debates 
surrounding the use of CACs. First, they provide a positive assessment of 
the recent legal reforms in Chile and Germany which repealed existing bans 
on the use of CACs in corporate debt. From a practical standpoint, the 
results suggest that corporate issuers and investors should strongly consider 
the inclusion of CACs in the instruments governing their bonds when 
allowed by applicable law and provide additional support for the inclusion 
of CACs in sovereign debt, an issue that has recently received much 
attention. From a policy perspective, the experience in Chile provides 
further support for the repeal of the longstanding ban on CACs for 
corporate bonds issued under U.S. law, a repeal that would result in lower 
interest rates, thereby reducing the cost of capital for issuers and fomenting 
economic growth.171 
 
 169 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 170 This result is robust to including various controls for issuer characteristics and is replicated in 
specifications that include issuer fixed-effects, confirming that these results are not driven by 
unobservable variables. See supra Part IV.A.2. In addition, the evidence indicates that including a CAC 
can potentially benefit all issuers regardless of their credit rating. See supra Part IV.B. 
 171 For a brief description of some of the proposed modifications to the TIA, see supra note 48 and 
accompanying text. 
